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Despite the dominant role corporations play in our economy, culture, and politics, 
the nature and purpose of corporations remain hotly contested. This conflict was 
brought to the fore in the recent Supreme Court opinions in Citizens United and 
Hobby Lobby. The prevailing narrative for the past quarter century has been that 
corporations “belong” to shareholders and should pursue “shareholder value,” but 
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support for that approach, which has long been justified as essential for managerial 
accountability, is eroding. Its proponents have retreated to the position that 
corporations should seek “long-term” shareholder value. Yet, as this Article shows, 
when shareholder value is interpreted to mean “long-term” shareholder value, it no 
longer offers the sought-after managerial accountability. 
What can? This Article argues that systems theory offers an answer. Systems 
theory is a well-developed design and performance measuring methodology routinely 
applied in fields such as engineering, biology, computer science, and environmental 
science. It provides an approach to understanding the nature and purpose of corporate 
entities that is not only consistent with elements of the many otherwise-conflicting 
visions of the corporation that have been developed, but also with important and 
otherwise difficult-to-explain features of corporate law and practice. It recognizes, 
and explains, the possibility and desirability of corporations pursuing multiple goals. 
It also offers proven methods for measuring and improving corporate performance—
methods that highlight the critical role of corporate sustainability, and specific 
strategies to promote it. Finally, it cautions that, by ignoring the lessons of systems 
theory, shareholder value thinking may have encouraged regulatory and policy 
interventions into corporate governance that are not only ineffective, but destructive. 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 581 
I. CONTESTED VISIONS AND THE ROLE OF  SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE THEORY ....................................................................... 586 
A. Contested Visions ........................................................................ 586 
B. The Rise and Evolution of Shareholder Value Theory ....................... 589 
C. Why Long-Term Shareholder Value Cannot Be Used to Hold 
Managers Accountable: The Problem of Uncertainty ........................ 596 
II. THE SYSTEMS ALTERNATIVE ................................................... 598 
A. What Is Systems Theory? ............................................................. 598 
B. Systems Theory and the Nature of the Corporation ........................... 601 
C. Systems and Sustainability ........................................................... 603 
D. Systems Theory and the Question of Corporate Purpose .................... 605 
E. Systems Theory and the Problem of Measuring Corporate 
Performance ............................................................................... 611 
III. SYSTEMS THINKING IN CORPORATE PRACTICE AND CORPORATE 
LAW .......................................................................................... 619 
A. Systems Thinking in Corporate Management ................................... 619 
B. Systems Thinking in Corporate Law ............................................... 621 
1. State Corporate Codes ........................................................ 621 
2. Case Law ........................................................................... 622 
3. Charters and Bylaws .......................................................... 624 
2018] Contested Visions 581 
C. On the Risks of Ignoring Systems ................................................... 625 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 630 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Any attempt to answer the question “what is a corporation?” is an exercise 
in negotiating contested visions of the nature and purpose of the corporate form. 
Some experts say the corporation is a grantee of the state and should serve a 
public purpose (concession theory).1 Others describe the corporation as a 
separate legal entity with the ability to hold property and enter contracts in its 
own name (entity theory).2 Still others argue the corporation is not “real” but 
rather is a nexus of privately negotiated contracts (nexus of contract theory).3 
Or perhaps a corporation should be viewed as an aggregation of natural persons 
(aggregate theory),4 or specific assets (team production),5 or the property of its 
shareholders (shareholder value theory or shareholder primacy)?6 
The recent twin U.S. Supreme Court cases of Citizens United v. FEC7 and 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.8 bring these contested visions of the nature 
and purpose of the corporation into sharp focus. In Citizens United, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion described corporations as “associations of 
citizens,”9 while Justice Stevens’s dissent insisted that corporations are not 
associations of people but legal entities that “have no consciences, no beliefs, 
no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”10 Stevens also observed there are 
multiple “recognized model[s]” of the corporate entity, including the state 
grantee, nexus of contracts, and team production models.11 In Hobby Lobby, 
Justice Alito repeatedly described a corporation’s shareholders as its 
“owners,”12 implying that a corporation is its shareholders’ property, while 
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent maintained that corporations were “artificial 
being[s]” separate from any individual13 and further noted that not only 
shareholders but also workers “sustain the operations of” corporations.14 In 
 
1 See infra text accompanying note 38. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 44–46. 
7 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
8 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
9 558 U.S. at 354. 
10 Id. at 466. 
11 Id. at 465-66, n.72. 
12 See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. at 2767, 2771, 2774, 2775. 
13 Id. at 2794 (quoting Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). 
14 Id. at 2795. 
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Citizens United, Justice Steven’s dissent spoke of corporate purpose in terms 
of “maximiz[ing] shareholder value”15 and “maximiz[ing] the returns on their 
shareholders’ investments.”16 In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito’s opinion for the 
majority expressed a different view, noting that “modern corporate law does 
not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of 
everything else, and many do not do so.”17 
This judicial disagreement illustrates the clash perceived to exist among 
the various “recognized models” of the corporation. In particular, Anglo-
American corporate scholarship and corporate governance practice have been 
dominated for most of the past three decades by a “standard” economic 
account that assumes that shareholders own and ultimately ought to control 
corporations; that shareholders’ principal interest is increasing their wealth; 
that the interests of other corporate constituencies, like employees and 
customers, should be protected primarily by contract and regulation; and that 
the market price of a public company’s shares is the principal measure of 
shareholders’ wealth.18 The result has been widespread embrace of the notion 
that corporate managers should seek first and foremost to “maximize 
shareholder value,” a philosophy of corporate purpose that is sometimes 
called shareholder value theory.19 As the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby 
opinions illustrate, however, this consensus seems to be falling apart as both 
the standard model and shareholder value theory have been subject to 
escalating criticism.20 Commentators have pointed out that the standard 
Anglo-American model ignores the significance of corporate legal 
personhood;21 that it does not fit with the very limited control granted 
 
15 558 U.S. at 454. 
16 Id. at 465 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990)). 
17 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
18 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History For Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (discussing a “growing consensus” around this standard model). In 
other work, Hansmann has explored alternative theories of corporate purpose. See generally, e.g., 
Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of 
Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948 (2014). 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 44–46. 
20 See, e.g., Statement on Company Law, MOD. CORP., https://themodern
corporation.wordpress.com/company-law-memo/ [https://perma.cc/R2JL-QJZU] (arguing in a 
memorandum signed by nearly fifty corporate law experts that “[c]ertain beliefs about corporations 
and corporate law are widely held and relied upon by business experts, the financial press, and 
economists who study the firm. Unfortunately, some of these widely-held beliefs are mistaken.”). 
21 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 268-71 (1992) (contrasting the property conception of the corporation with 
the entity conception of the corporation, which views corporations as “independent social actors”); 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
248, 292 (1999) (“In the eyes of the law, filing articles of incorporation creates a new entity, separate 
from its promoters and shareholders.”); Jean-Phillipe Robé, The Legal Structure of the Firm, 1 ACCT. 
ECON. & L. 2-3 (2011) (criticizing proponents of the “dominant theory” for “disregard[ing]” the 
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shareholders under actual corporate law;22 that the standard model leads to 
social inefficiency when, as may often be the case, contracts are incomplete 
and regulation is imperfect;23 and that stock market prices often fail to 
capture long-term economic value.24 Moreover, commentators have 
associated shareholder value theory with a number of recent corporate 
scandals and business failures, including the 2008 financial crisis.25 In this 
Article, we shed light on and resolve much of the ongoing debate by 
suggesting a new and more unifying approach to understanding 
corporations—that of systems thinking. 
Systems theory is a design and assessment methodology routinely 
employed in a wide variety of fields, including computer science, engineering, 
biology, and environmental science. It can be applied to any process (system) 
in which multiple elements interact with each other, over time, to achieve 
particular purposes or functions. We argue that, as potentially perpetual 
entities that operate under uncertain conditions, public companies in 
particular can be viewed as complex systems in which multiple elements (e.g., 
financial capital, physical capital, and human capital) interact with each other 
to perform a variety of useful and desirable functions (e.g., providing goods 
and services, employment opportunities, investor returns, and tax revenues). 
Applying principles of systems theory allows us to articulate a vision of 
the corporation that allows for a better understanding of the interaction 
between an artificial legal entity and its human actors/agents; allows room to 
consider the role of the state, without which legal entity status could not be 
conferred; offers new strategies and methodologies for ensuring managerial 
accountability; and helps us better understand the relationships between and 
among stockholders, directors, creditors, employees, and the corporate person 
 
importance of corporations’ “juridical personality” and improperly dismissing it as a mere “‘legal 
fiction’”). 
22 See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 290-308 (discussing the relationship between directors, 
shareholders, and the firm, and observing that corporate directors are not subject to direct control 
by the firm’s shareholders); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1996) (noting that “as a matter of law, 
shareholders, even taken as a collectivity, lack the control over directors that characterizes an 
ordinary agency relationship”); see also infra Section I.C. 
23 See, e.g., JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION 60-85 (2005) (discussing the costs to third-
parties of corporations’ actions); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 776 (2005) (“[T]he corporate structure has implications for the ability of social 
or moral sanctions to police corporate conduct that might inefficiently harm those outside the 
corporation.”). 
24 See, e.g., JOHN QUIGGEN, ZOMBIE ECONOMICS 35-78 (2010) (arguing that the 2008 
financial crisis effectively discredited the efficient market hypothesis); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637 (2003) 
(discussing the failure of the efficient market theory to “capture the reality of securities markets”). 
25 See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text (discussing destructive effects of shareholder 
value thinking). 
584 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 579 
itself. It also highlights the importance of considering sustainability as a 
corporate desideratum and offers specific strategies for measuring and 
improving it. Viewed through a systems theory lens, profits are less an 
objective than a constraint that must be met for continued operation. Thus, 
we demonstrate how systems theory offers useful insights into the nature and 
purpose of corporations and the best way to assess their performance—and, 
in the process, helps to integrate many apparently conflicting elements of the 
various contesting visions of the firm.26 
In Part I of the Article, we provide a brief summary of competing theories 
of the corporation. We pay particularly close attention to the dominant 
shareholder value theory and provide an overview of its traditional and current 
justifications. We show how, while shareholder value theory initially was 
justified by the factual claims that shareholders own corporations and that 
shareholders are the sole residual claimants of corporations, today these 
empirical claims are increasingly being called into question. Instead, supporters 
of shareholder value theory now typically argue that corporations ought to be 
run to maximize shareholder value because only shareholder value offers the 
single, quantifiable metric supposedly needed to constrain agency costs and 
hold corporate directors and officers accountable. Yet this new justification is 
also being challenged on several grounds, especially that when shareholder 
value is equated to stock price or current accounting profits, shareholder value 
thinking encourages shortsighted business decisions. Thus, shareholder value 
thinking has been associated with excessive risk taking, reduced investment and 
innovation, and diminished long-term business performance.27 
 
26 More specifically, we apply systems theory to business firms organized as corporations. 
Strictly speaking, a “firm” is not the same thing as a “corporation.” See Robé, supra note 21, at 3 (“The 
firm and the corporation are very often confused in the literature on the theory of the firm. The two 
words are often used as synonyms.”). However, we employ the common practice of using the words 
as synonyms to describe large firms organized as incorporated legal entities. The corporate form can 
be thought of as the legal armature or framework upon which many firms are built. Incorporation 
as a “legal person” allows firms to hold assets and incur liabilities in their own names and to operate 
in perpetuity. See generally Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
764 (2012); Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253. 
27 See ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC. PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM 2 (2009), 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YAE5-GWJ6] (describing the risks created by a focus on short-term stock price 
and performance); J.W. MASON, ROOSEVELT INST., UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERMISM 29 
(2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/understanding-short-termism-questions-and-consequences/ 
[https://perma.cc/K4RY-KGX7] (concluding that “by pressuring managers to pay out funds instead 
of investing them, shareholders are simply reducing production and income in the economy as a 
whole”); William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, at 48, 50 
(arguing that the incentives to maximize shareholder value led executives to undertake stock 
repurchases, which in turn led to the failure to translate corporate profitability into widespread 
economic prosperity);  Usman Hayat, Shareholder Value Maximization: The World’s Dumbest Idea?, 
CFA INST. (Oct. 23, 2014), https://eic.cfainstitute.org/2014/10/23/shareholder-value-maximization-
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In light of these criticisms, many contemporary shareholder value 
supporters have reframed their justification: they now speak in terms of 
maximizing “long-term” value rather than immediate profit or share price 
appreciation. While reorienting towards long-term value is arguably an 
improvement over an exclusively short-term focus, especially in light of the 
possibly perpetual nature of the corporate entity, we show how a shift to a 
long-term value focus actually reduces shareholder value theory’s ability to 
ensure its stated goal of accountability. We conclude Part I by suggesting that 
there may be a better approach for evaluating corporate performance and 
achieving true managerial accountability, while honoring the complexity and 
diversity of the corporate form: systems thinking. 
In Part II, we introduce systems thinking and the idea of the corporation 
as a system. We survey the basic principles of systems theory and consider 
what insights they provide about the nature of corporations, their purpose, 
and how to best measure the performance of a corporate system in order to 
hold managers accountable. In particular, we show how systems thinking 
teaches that corporations may serve multiple purposes, and indeed one’s view 
of corporate purpose may depend on one’s perspective.28 Nevertheless, 
systems theory has developed a variety of methodologies and mathematical 
techniques that can be used to measure managerial performance (including 
assessing sustainability). These can determine, if not whether managers are 
doing the best possible job, at least whether they are doing a better, or a worse 
one. Thus, the systems approach offers well-developed tools and 
methodologies for promoting managerial accountability. 
In Part III, we turn our attention to some practical and theoretical 
implications of such an approach. We show how systems thinking is 
embedded in the way successful managers talk about what they do, as well as 
the strategies and performance assessment methods they employ. We also 
show how, in comparison to many other models of the corporation, systems 
theory fits better with state corporate codes, the holdings of corporate cases, 
and the “internal” law of corporate charters and bylaws. We point out that as 
public corporations have become more shareholder-centric, the shift has been 
 
the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/N7AA-AHFL]; Is Short-Term Behavior 
Jeopardizing the Future Prosperity of Business?, CONF. BOARD (2015), 
www.wlrk.com/docs/IsShortTermBehaviorJeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_
CEOStrategicImplications.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EA7-SGFX] (explaining the view that 
shareholder maximization contributes to “such major economic and social problems as short-termism 
and rising inequality”). 
28 Systems thinking treats corporate purpose as complex, fluid, and, to some degree, subjective. 
This approach can explain important elements of corporate reality that shareholder value thinking 
cannot explain, just as the theory of relativity—which treats physical reality as complex, fluid, and 
to some degree subjective—explains physical phenomenon that Newtonian physics cannot. See infra 
Section II.D (discussing corporate purpose under the systems approach). 
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driven primarily by federal regulations and other external interventions, 
which bear the hallmarks of rent-seeking and have been associated with a 
variety of undesirable outcomes. 
We conclude that, especially in light of the close correspondence between 
systems thinking and traditional corporate law and practice, systems theory 
offers an intriguing and indeed compelling approach for understanding the 
nature of corporations, their proper purpose, and the best way to hold their 
managers accountable. In the process, it offers to integrate and sometimes 
reconcile the many competing visions of the corporation being debated today. 
I. CONTESTED VISIONS AND THE ROLE OF  
SHAREHOLDER VALUE THEORY 
A. Contested Visions 
Scholars, judges, regulators, and practitioners have long debated what 
corporations are and what their purpose should be. The literature is replete 
with different theories or models, each of which attempts to reduce the pattern 
of legal rights, responsibilities, duties, and privileges typically found in 
corporations into a single coherent description.29 Thus, the corporation has 
been described as: (1) an entity; (2) an aggregate of people; (3) a web of 
contracts; (4) a government concession or “franchise government”; (5) a 
collection of specific investments; and (6) the property of its shareholders.30 
Each model offers its own particular vision of how best to describe the 
corporation, given its semiautonomous, perpetual nature, legal personhood, 
and the interwoven web of human relationships and interactions that often 
present in the corporate form. 
The entity theory is perhaps best encapsulated in Chief Justice Marshall’s 
famous statement in the 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
that the corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law.”31 In the 1933 case of Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 
Justice Louis Brandeis expressed a similar view, describing the corporation as 
a “Frankenstein monster which States have created by their corporation 
laws.”32 Entity theory captures certain core characteristics of the corporate 
form, particularly its status as a legal person entitled to exercise certain rights 
(e.g., to own property, enter contracts, and incur liabilities) in its own name. 
 
29 See generally Lynn Stout, The Economic Nature of the Corporation, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 343-48 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017); Allen, supra note 21; David Millon, 
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 31–46 (discussing the various conceptualizations of a corporation). 
31 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
32 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Entity theory is also consistent with the corporation’s ability to exist into 
perpetuity. However, entity theory has been critiqued on the grounds that 
the corporate entity is “not real.”33 
In juxtaposition to entity theory, which treats the corporation as its own 
legal person, aggregate theory views the corporation as an aggregation of 
natural persons. Aggregate theory was perhaps at play in Justice Kennedy’s 
description of corporations in Citizens United as “associations of citizens.”34 
Aggregate theory captures the reality that corporations must act and make 
decisions through their human agents. However, the aggregate approach 
raises several challenging questions: which natural persons should count as 
agents of the aggregate? Should everyone involved in the corporate enterprise 
be considered a member? Or, should membership be limited to the board, 
executives, and shareholders? Furthermore, within what timeframe must a 
person be involved with the company to be considered a member—today, or 
at the founding? As this last question suggests, the notion of perpetual 
corporate life is hard to reconcile with the aggregate theory.35 
The nexus of contract theory views the corporation as a “nexus” or web of 
explicit and implicit contracts, between and among various parties associated 
with the corporation, such as the board, the shareholders, creditors, and 
employees.36 Like the aggregate theory, the nexus of contracts theory does 
not recognize the corporation as its own separate and real entity. It emphasizes 
instead the voluntary nature of most human participation in creating and 
pursuing corporate endeavors. And it acknowledges the generally enabling 
nature of corporate law, which allows significant latitude to corporate 
participants to engage in private bargaining and contracting around various 
default rules. However, the nexus of contracts theory can be critiqued as failing 
 
33 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (“[T]he corporation is not real. It is no more than a name for a complex 
set of contracts among managers, workers, and contributors of capital. It has no existence independent 
of these relations.”); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (describing corporations 
as “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals”). 
34 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010). 
35 The Delaware Supreme Court recently upheld a decision to require TransPerfect’s founders 
and 100 percent shareholders to collectively sell their shares in the company, on the theory that their 
dysfunctional relationship was damaging to the corporation and “its constituencies.” Shawe v. Elting, 
157 A.3d 152, 166 (Del. 2017). This holding is inconsistent with the notion that a corporation is 
comprised only of its current and/or original shareholders. 
36 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That 
the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1998) 
(“[T]he nexus-of-contracts conception does not mean either that the corporation is a nexus of 
agreements or that it is a nexus of legally enforceable promises. Instead, the conception means that 
the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements.”). 
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to acknowledge the corporation’s legal personhood, and also as failing to 
emphasize the crucial role played by the state in creating the corporation.37 
The state concession theory of the corporation and its modern descendant, 
the political franchise theory, recognizes the role of the state in granting a 
corporation legal personhood and acknowledges that a corporation’s internal 
governance structures in many ways mirror governance structures of a political 
state.38 It also highlights how early corporations were granted corporate 
personhood by the state for expressly public purposes and not merely as a 
means for garnering private profits. A main limitation of the political franchise 
theory is that the model is primarily focused on the relationship between the 
corporate entity and the governing state, but provides less guidance on which 
internal governance structures are most desirable for corporations.39 
The team production model addresses internal governance structure by 
hypothesizing that, at least in public corporations, the firm is governed by a 
relatively independent board of directors that serves as a “mediating hierarch” 
to protect the specific investments not only of shareholders but also 
employees, creditors, customers, and other important stakeholders whose 
interests in their relationship with the business cannot be completely 
protected by explicit contracts or regulation.40 This protection encourages 
collective specific investment in “team production” projects (especially long-
term, large-scale, uncertain projects) that can generate significant social 
wealth.41 The team production model explains many aspects of corporate law 
and structure, including the wide discretion granted directors under the 
business judgment rule.42 It has been critiqued, however, as applying mainly 
to public corporations and also as undermining managerial accountability.43 
 
37 See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1339-43 
(2006) (emphasizing the importance of the corporate entity form in ensuring that shareholders’ 
creditors cannot reach corporate assets, and arguing that private contract alone cannot create such 
entities). 
38 See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 139-40 (2013) (describing corporate entities as “franchise governments” 
because they are granted “external ‘personhood’” and “internal governing authority” by the state, 
such that they are “government-like,” but “run on private initiative”). 
39 Cf. id. (outlining relationships between corporations and state, but not addressing questions 
of governance structure). 
40 See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 218, 280-81 (describing a corporation as a team of 
people—including shareholders, employees, and stakeholders—with a board that acts as a mediating 
hierarch to balances the interests of the team so it stays together). 
41 Id. at 278. 
42 See id. at 300 (explaining the business judgement rule as protecting directors from breach of 
duty liability provided they can demonstrate that the decision was made on an informed basis in 
good faith and on the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company). 
43 See Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2002) (arguing that the mediating hierarchy approach would 
undermine the shareholders’ managerial role and so cannot be applied to private firms). 
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While the entity, aggregation, nexus of contract, political franchise, and 
team production theories each have influential supporters and each contribute 
to our understanding of the corporate form, in recent years Anglo-American 
corporate law scholarship and policy discussions have been dominated by yet 
another theory that might be called the “shareholder value” theory. Given this 
context, the remainder of Part I will focus on the achievements and critiques 
of shareholder value theory. 
B. The Rise and Evolution of Shareholder Value Theory 
For the past quarter century, the dominant, albeit not exclusive, narrative 
of corporate purpose in the Anglo-American world has been that business 
corporations have but one goal: to maximize shareholder wealth or 
“shareholder value.”44 It is difficult to overstate just how much shareholder 
value theory has influenced contemporary corporate governance, especially 
in the United States.45 This influence is reflected in law review articles, the 
dicta of judicial opinions, policy reports, and federal securities regulation.46 
 
44 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 463; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: 
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2003) (observing that 
“most corporate law scholars embrace some variant of shareholder primacy”). 
45 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 33 (2012) (“The idea of shareholder 
primacy has gained enormous traction among laymen, journalists, economists, and business 
leaders.”); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1910 
(2013) (noting that “[s]ince the early 1980s, the U.S. system has shifted . . . to a shareholder-centric 
system”); DARRELL WEST, BROOKINGS INST., THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION IN BUSINESS 
AND LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 17-18 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/0719_corporation_west.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3KJ-CKVM] (discussing the prevalence and 
emphasis on shareholder value in business and law school curriculums). 
46 Law professor Jeffrey Gordon has observed that “[b]y the end of the 1990s, the triumph of 
the shareholder value criterion was nearly complete.” Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1465, 1530 (2007). Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United assumed a shareholder value 
framework, see supra text accompanying note 15, and Delaware Chancellor William Chandler opined 
in Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark that corporate directors’ decisions should “ultimately 
promote stockholder value.” 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010). A report from the National Association 
of Corporate Directors concluded that “[t]he primary objective of the corporation is to conduct 
business activities with a view to enhancing profit and shareholder gain.” NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. 
DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 1 
(1995). Interestingly, and consistent with systems thinking, the report does note that “long-term 
shareholder gain” depends on “fair treatment” of non-shareholder constituents. Id. at 1. At the level 
of federal regulation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently decided that 
public companies should provide enhanced graphic disclosure of how executive pay relates to a 
corporation’s financial performance, defining financial “performance” in terms of share price 
appreciation and dividends paid to shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(e) (2017) (defining 
performance as the sum of the cumulative amount of dividends for the measurement period). 
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Yet it is only relatively recently that the idea that public corporations exist 
to maximize shareholder wealth has acquired such power.47 Why did this 
occur? In part, shareholder value theory gained traction because it served the 
purposes of powerful interest groups, including newly emerging “activist” 
investors48 and executives whose compensation, due to 1993 changes in the 
tax code, increasingly was based on share price.49 But shareholder value 
theory has also been embraced because it has been perceived as sufficiently 
intellectually justified. In particular, shareholder value theory has been 
justified by an evolution of three claims: first, that shareholders own 
corporations; second, that shareholders are the residual claimants in 
corporations; and third, that shareholder value provides the single 
quantifiable metric that is essential to constrain agency costs and hold 
corporate directors and executives accountable. 
It is increasingly recognized now that the first two claims are 
demonstrably incorrect. The notion that shareholders “own” corporations is 
often associated with Nobel Prize–winning economist Milton Friedman’s 
famous 1970 article, in which he argued that, because shareholders own 
corporations, the only “social responsibility of business [is] to increase its 
profits.”50 While this idea that shareholders own corporations retains 
emotional power among laypersons and many business journalists,51 legal 
experts widely recognize it to be empirically incorrect.52 One of the hallmarks 
 
47 During most of the 20th century and well into the 1980s, corporate directors and executives 
embraced a vision of corporate purpose called managerial capitalism or simply managerialism. See 
GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS 71-84 (2009) (explaining that the simultaneous 
dispersion of shareholder interests among the public and concentration of market power in a few large 
companies gave birth to managerial capitalism that lasted until the Reagan Administration reshuffled 
“the industrial deck”). According to the managerialist philosophy, business corporations are important 
social institutions that ought to serve not only shareholders but also employees, customers, suppliers, 
communities, and the nation as a whole, while managers are not shareholders’ agents but stewards or 
trustees with fiduciary duties to these institutions. Id. at 74 (reflecting economist Carly Kaysen’s 
assertion that the “soul of the corporation . . . had been found by its managers”). The managerialist 
philosophy thus arguably included elements of entity theory, state concession theory, and stakeholder 
and team production theory. 
48 See Rock, supra note 45, at 1910 (identifying shareholder activism as a contributing cause to 
the rise of the shareholder value theory). 
49 See STOUT, supra note 45, at 21 (noting that the “shift to stock-based compensation ensured 
that . . . managers in U.S. companies had stronger personal incentives to run public corporations 
according to the ideals of shareholder value thinking”). 
50 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 124. 
51 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Whole Foods’ High Hurdle for Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/business/whole-foods-high-hurdle-for-investors-.html 
[https://nyti.ms/1zKfPcN] (asserting, without authority, that “shareholders own the companies they 
invest in”). 
52 See Statement on Company Law, supra note 20 (“Contrary to widely held ‘common sense’, 
shareholders do not own corporations.”). 
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of the corporate form is that corporations are legal persons with rights, 
including the right to hold property in their own names. This means that, just 
as a natural person cannot be owned by another, a corporation cannot be 
owned by its shareholders.53 What shareholders do own are shares.54 Shares 
can be viewed as a kind of contract between shareholders and the corporate 
entity, just as an employment agreement or bond can be viewed as a contract 
between the corporate entity and an employee or bondholder. The 
shareholders’ contract, moreover, typically gives shareholders only very 
limited rights; one such right is the right to elect and remove directors. 55 But, 
as has been recognized since at least the days of Berle and Means,56 this right 
carries almost no real influence in the context of a public corporation with 
dispersed share ownership.57 Contemporary experts accordingly are often 
careful to avoid describing corporations as “owned” by shareholders.58 
What about the second claim: that shareholders are the residual claimants 
entitled to all profits left over after the business has met its contractual and 
legal obligations (e.g., interest due creditors, wages due employees, and taxes 
due governments)?59 Again, experts increasingly recognize that, for several 
reasons, shareholders are not the sole residual claimants of corporations—at least 
not of operating companies.60 First, corporations, as legal persons, are their own 
 
53 See Robé, supra note 21, at 27 (“Strictly speaking . . . no one owns the corporation because it 
is not an object of property rights.”). 
54 See Statement on Company Law, supra note 20 (“Shareholders only own shares of stock—bundles 
of intangible rights, most particularly the rights to receive dividends and to vote on limited issues.”). 
55 Id. 
56 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 244 (1932) (“The stockholder is therefore left as a matter of law with little more 
than the loose expectation that a group of men, under a nominal duty to run the enterprise for his 
benefit and that of others like him, will actually observe this obligation.”). 
57 It might be forgivable to describe a corporation with a single individual shareholder as 
“owned” by that individual on the theory that, despite formal limitations on shareholder power, as a 
practical matter a sole shareholder has both the economic interest and the managerial power of a 
proprietor. This is clearly not the case for shareholders in a public company. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007) (arguing that shareholders do 
not have the “powers of corporate democracy” at their disposal). 
58 See, e.g., ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS 434 (2d ed. 2014) 
(“[S]hareholders do not ‘own’ the corporation in the same way a proprietor owns her own business.”). 
59 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 36-37 (1991) (“For most firms the expectation is that the residual risk bearers 
have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the 
value of their stock.”); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment 
Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101, 102-03 (1985) (describing the impact of residual claims of open 
corporations on the development of capital markets). 
60 It may be reasonable to describe shareholders as sole residual claimants when a company is 
being liquidated. Nevertheless, even in the bankruptcy context, Professor LoPucki has shown that courts 
often require creditors to share in stockholders’ losses to some extent. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of 
the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1342 (2004) (concluding that an 
identifiable, single residual owner class rarely exists in practice). However, companies in liquidation are 
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residual claimants. The corporation’s profits are the property of the corporate 
entity and not the property of its shareholders.61 Second, modern options theory 
teaches that, once a corporation has issued debt, its debtholders also have a 
residual interest in how the company is run.62 Third, when important corporate 
“stakeholders” make specific investments in a corporation’s continued operation 
(for example, when employees acquire skills uniquely valuable to the company as 
an employer, or when customers become dependent on its products), these 
stakeholders also acquire a residual interest in the company’s operations.63 
Fourth, if social norms and government regulation cannot perfectly control 
corporate behavior—a likely scenario—directors’ and executives’ managerial 
decisions can generate external costs and benefits for third parties. These 
externalities give third parties an interest in how the company is managed.64 
The flaws in the traditional defenses of shareholder value theory have led 
contemporary commentators to rely ever more heavily on a third justification: 
that shareholder value is necessary to ensure managerial accountability.65 
According to this third view, the only way to ensure managerial accountability 
is to hold managers’ collective feet to the fire by demanding they maximize a 
single quantifiable metric. As influential economist Michael Jensen has put it, 
“telling a manager to maximize current profits, market share, future growth in 
profits, and anything else one pleases will leave the manager with no way to 
make a reasoned decision. In effect, it leaves the manager with no objective.”66 
 
subject to different legal rules than operating companies. See STOUT, supra note 45, at 39 (“Living 
corporations are different entities with fundamentally different purposes than dead corporations.”). 
61 See STOUT, supra note 45, at 40 (observing that shareholders “cannot get any money out of 
a functioning public corporation . . . unless the board of directors wants” them to); see also Harbor Fin. 
Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 900 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[P]roperty of the corporation is not 
typically thought of as personal property of the stockholders.”). 
62 If a corporation issues debt as well as equity, it is just as correct to say that the debtholder has the 
right to the corporation’s profits but has sold a call option to the shareholders, as it is to say that the 
shareholders have the right to the profits but have sold a put option to the debtholder. See generally Fischer 
Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). 
63 See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 276 n.61 (“Rank-and-file employees make firm-specific 
investments when they acquire company-specific skills . . . and even the local community may make 
firm-specific investments if, for example, it builds roads, schools, or other infrastructure to meet the 
needs of the firm or its employees.”). 
64 See generally BAKAN, supra note 23; EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (2010). 
65 One of the central problems of corporate law is the problem of ensuring that directors and 
executives do not abuse their corporate powers and employ those powers to serve themselves. In the 
parlance of economics, this is the problem of “agency costs.” See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 33, 
at 308 (“[I]t is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the 
agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.”). Whether corporate directors 
and executives are viewed as agents of the corporation itself, of the corporation’s shareholders, or of 
some combination of the two, the basic problem remains the same: how do we keep corporate 
managers from shirking, stealing, and running amok? 
66 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective 
Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 238 (2002). 
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Jensen concluded that a “true (single dimensional) score” was essential.67 
According to shareholder value theorists, financial returns to shareholders 
provide that single metric. For example, law professor Stephen Bainbridge has 
written that “absent the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the board 
would lack a determinant metric for assessing options.”68 This, Bainbridge 
fretted, would allow directors “to pursue their own self-interest . . . . Directors 
who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one.”69 
Thus, managerial accountability has emerged as the supposed chief 
advantage of shareholder value theory relative to other competing models of 
the corporation. Yet even this justification has become subject to critical 
scrutiny in recent years. In the past decade, a host of research institutes, 
business leaders, and prominent commentators have protested that when 
shareholder value is defined in terms of share price or other immediately 
quantifiable metrics,70 asking managers to maximize “shareholder value” 
 
67 Id. at 235; see also Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 
299, 303 (1993) (observing that a prescription for management to take account of the interests of 
multiple corporate constituencies “is essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify 
almost any action on the grounds that it benefits some group”). 
68 Stephen Bainbridge, The Siren Song of Corporate Social Responsibility, TCS DAILY (Nov. 14, 
2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2005/11/the-siren-song-of-corporate-
social-responsibility.html [https://perma.cc/7PSC-F5VK]. Mark Roe has similarly written that 
allowing managers to consider non-shareholder interests “could leave managers so much discretion 
that managers could easily pursue their own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, 
employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own.” Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001). 
69 Bainbridge, supra note 68. 
70 The idea of “shareholder value” raises the obvious problem of how that value is to be 
measured. One possible candidate is share price. Indeed, Daniel Fischel and now-Judge Frank 
Easterbrook famously argued in 1981 that directors destroy shareholder value whenever they reject 
a takeover bid at a premium price, based on the theoretical notion of a “fundamental value efficient” 
stock market that perfectly captures the future economic gains from holding shares. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender 
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981) (arguing that “allowing the target’s management to engage 
in defensive tactics in response to a tender offer decrease[s] shareholders’ welfare”); see also Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms Of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554 (1984) 
(defining market efficiency as occurring when “prices at any time fully reflect all available 
information” (internal quotation marks omitted)). By the close of the twentieth century, however, the 
idea that stock market prices always capture fundamental value had been largely abandoned by 
sophisticated commentators in the face of an enormous and growing empirical and theoretical 
literature demonstrating this often was not true. See Stout, supra note 24. Today, experts typically 
describe market efficiency in terms only of “informational efficiency,” meaning the speed with which 
prices adjust to new information. See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE 122 (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1st ed. 1987) (describing three variants of the market efficiency 
theory that vary in what level of information is reflected in market prices); see also QUIGGEN, supra 
note 24, at 1-2 (describing the idea of an efficient market as a “zombie” idea that survives today only 
in greatly diminished form). 
Another possibility is to interpret shareholder value not in terms of share price per se but in 
terms of current shareholders’ satisfaction with that price, as reflected in their willingness to defer to the 
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generates a host of corporate pathologies, including excessive risk-taking, 
underinvestment, reduced innovation, increasing disparities between 
executive and rank-and-file pay, and a general focus on short-term results at 
the expense of long-term performance.71 An unhealthy managerial focus on 
immediate results has been accused of driving companies like Motorola72 and 
Hewlett-Packard73 to sacrifice their resilience and long-term performance by 
restructuring, selling assets, and cutting “expenses” for marketing, R&D, and 
employee development in order to boost the bottom line. It was suspected of 
 
judgment of the corporation’s board. Thus, Lucian Bebchuk has argued in several articles that it is 
desirable to give shareholders greater power over boards, so that directors have greater incentive to keep 
current shareholders happy. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case 
for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW 43 (2003) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Access]. This 
view remains controversial. It has even been described as “radical”—as many of the shareholders whom 
Bebchuk would empower are hedge funds and actively managed mutual funds that typically hold 
positions for only a year or two. See David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
1013, 1014, 1040 (2013) (arguing that such an approach would empower institutional shareholders that own 
“on the order of three-quarters of the stock of the one thousand largest U.S. corporations,” and “pursue 
short-term investment strategies”). Indeed, although corporations are perpetual entities, the average 
holding period for U.S. stocks may be as low as four months. STOUT, supra note 45, at 66 (arriving at 
that figure based on the annual share turnover as of 2010). 
71 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
72 In 2013, Motorola set a goal of cutting $200 million in expenses by the end of the year. It 
then upped that number to $300 million, which it reached by selling its corporate campus in 2014. 
John Pletz, Motorola Solutions to Shrink—Again, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140805/BLOGS11/140809915/motorola-solutions-to-
shrink-again [https://perma.cc/57AD-22PP]. In 2015, Motorola announced plans to cut 25% of its 
2000 Chicago employees as part of an “overall restructuring.” Motorola Mobility Cutting 500 Jobs in 
Chicago, NBC CHI. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/inc-well/Motorola-Mobility-
Cutting-500-Jobs-in-Chicago-321796502.html [https://perma.cc/H5T9-KWL2]. 
73 In 2015, after already having laid off 55,000 workers as part of a restructuring, HP 
announced an additional 30,000 job cuts aimed at reducing expenses. Michael Liedtke, Hewlett-
Packard to Cut Up to 30,000 Jobs in Effort to Shave Expenses, GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://globalnews.ca/news/2223329/hewlett-packard-to-cut-up-to-30000-jobs-in-effort-to-shave-expenses/ 
[https://perma.cc/VJ6W-CVUL]. The cuts produced a short term increase in share price. Sue Chang, 
H-P Shares Rally After Company Announces Big Job Cuts, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/h-p-shares-rally-after-company-announces-big-job-cuts-2015-09-16 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Nevertheless, HP stock remained down 30% despite the layoffs. Id. The 
company continues to cut jobs in an “effort to reduce costs and protect the bottom line for 
shareholders.” Richard Milam, Hewlett-Packard and Others Reduce Labor Costs by Restructuring 
Workload, U.S. DAILY REV. (Sept. 30, 2015), http://usdailyreview.com/hewlett-packard-and-others-
reduce-labor-costs-by-restructuring-workload/ [https://perma.cc/T3W9-3246]. 
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encouraging companies like BP74 and Volkswagen75 to cut safety and 
regulatory corners. It has also been identified as a root cause of the 2008 
financial crisis, when it drove banks to make risky mortgage loans and to 
leverage themselves to the brink of insolvency and beyond.76 
In response, many supporters of shareholder value have adjusted their 
stance yet again. They now emphasize that what they mean is “long-term 
shareholder value.” For example, in a 2015 opinion piece, Steven Bainbridge 
wrote that “the law requires corporate directors and managers to pursue long-
term, sustainable shareholder wealth maximization.”77 In the 2009 case of In Re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, which arose out of the 2008 
financial crisis, Delaware Chancellor William B. Chandler opined that 
“[u]ltimately, the discretion granted directors and managers allows them to 
maximize shareholder value in the long term.”78 In a recent law review article, 
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine similarly described 
shareholder welfare as served by “that course of action [that] will best advance 
the interests of stockholders in the long run.”79 The remainder of Part I 
examines this argument—that long term shareholder value provides the 
 
74 See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG., & ENF’T, REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSE 
OF THE APRIL 20, 2010 MACONDO WELL BLOWOUT 1 (2011) (concluding the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
was the result of “poor risk management, last-minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to 
critical indicators, inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response training by 
companies”); David Brodwin, The Costs of Corporate Corner-Cutting, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/09/05/bp-and-pacific-gas-and-electric-show-
corner-cutting-causes-disaster [https://perma.cc/UEP8-848W] (arguing that “top management put too 
much focus on delivering financial performance and gave too little authority to internal quality and safety 
development”); Steve Tobak, BP’s Gulf Oil Spill: The Perils of Cutting Corners, CBS NEWS (June 1, 2010) 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bps-gulf-oil-spill-the-perils-of-cutting-corners/ [https://perma.cc/NE85-
AE8P] (opining that the disaster “comes down to BP’s leadership failing to make a commitment to 
stop cutting corners”). 
75 See Volkswagen makes a monumental blunder, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5828e3c6-6051-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3qfZHsOlm 
[https://perma.cc/66PA-UYDE] (suggesting VW’s decision to fit diesel cars with code that tricked 
regulations was driven by a strategic interest in expanding the market for diesel cars). 
76 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (2011), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK84-QNXU] 
(reporting that financial executives were driven by the desire to increase market share and profits in 
response to shareholders’ demands). 
77 Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obligations-to-shareholders/a-duty-
to-shareholder-value [https://perma.cc/9R7A-WYPD] (emphasis added). 
78 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009) (emphasis added). 
79 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need For A Clear-eyed Understanding of the Power 
and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 761, 764 (2015) (emphasis added); see also Millon, supra note 70, at 1018-21 (describing 
“traditional” shareholder primacy as focusing on long-term performance); Schwartz, supra note 26, 
at 765 (describing corporations’ purpose as long-run value creation). 
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single quantifiable metric needed to constrain agency costs and hold 
corporate managers accountable—because it now stands as the principal 
remaining intellectual foundation for shareholder value theory today. 
C. Why Long-Term Shareholder Value Cannot Be Used to Hold Managers 
Accountable: The Problem of Uncertainty 
On first inspection, the idea of defining “shareholder value” in terms of 
the long term seems eminently sensible. Corporations, after all, are perpetual 
entities capable of earning profits and paying dividends into an indefinite 
future.80 Throughout history they have pursued projects that lasted years, 
decades, or even centuries. In the Middle Ages, corporate entities constructed 
monasteries, cathedrals, and universities. In the seventeenth century they 
opened continents for trade. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth 
centuries they built canals, railroads, and electrical grids. Today, they are 
developing self-driving cars and commercial space transport.81 
Yet once we shift from defining “shareholder value” in terms of stock price 
or similar short-term metrics, to an amorphous concept like long-term 
shareholder value, the claim that shareholder value theory offers a superior 
way to hold managers accountable begins to collapse. This is because, once 
we abandon the fundamental-efficient-markets presumption that today’s 
stock price perfectly captures intrinsic value,82 the corporate entity’s 
perpetual nature raises insoluble barriers to objectively quantifying “long-
term value.” Over time, a successful business corporation provides 
shareholders with a stream of financial returns in the form of share 
appreciation and dividends paid. Shareholder value theory blithely presumes 
this stream of future returns can be observed, neatly summed up, and 
discounted to present value, so as to reach a single agreed-upon number.83 
 
80 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 773 (“[A] defining attribute of the corporation is perpetual 
existence.”). 
81 See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 696-98 (2015) 
(describing the history of long-term projects instituted by corporations). 
82 See supra note 70 (discussing the decline of the idea of fundamental value efficiency). 
83 Discounted cash flow (DCF) is an example of this valuation technique. Finance theory 
teaches that the further into the future a payment is received, the more it should be discounted. On 
this basis, some might argue that it is efficient for managers to focus on short-term results. Yet 
corporations are perpetuities; short-term strategies that harm long-term results reduce not just one 
future payment, but an infinite stream of future payments. This makes long-term results more 
significant. For example, assuming a 5% annual discount rate, a company with annual profits of $1,000 
has a present value of $20,000. A corporate investment that doubles future profits to $2,000 annually 
increases the company’s present value to $40,000—a 100% increase in value that is largely attributable 
to increased profits received five or more years out. See generally SIMON Z. BENNINGA & ODED H. 
SARIG, CORPORATE FINANCE (1997). Andrew Schwartz provides an extensive discussion of 
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This presumption unrealistically assumes away one of the business world’s 
most endemic challenges: the problem of uncertainty. 
The concept of uncertainty is key to understanding why long-term 
shareholder value is a vague and indeterminate goal that cannot be used to hold 
managers accountable. Although laypersons often use “risk” and “uncertainty” 
as synonyms, finance economists view them as different concepts.84 Risk refers 
to variation in future outcomes where the nature of the possible outcomes and 
their statistical probabilities are both fully known. A coin toss is merely risky: 
although we do not know if the result will be heads or tails, it must be one or 
the other, and we know with certainty the probability of each is 50 percent. 
Uncertainty, in contrast, describes situations where either the possible future 
outcomes, the probabilities of those outcomes, or both, remain to some extent 
unknown. Whether Apple will thrive without Steve Jobs, and whether Google 
will profit from developing self-driving vehicles, are questions involving not 
only risk but also uncertainty.85 
Investors, analysts, and finance professors can employ a number of 
comfortably familiar mathematical techniques to value economic ventures 
that are merely risky. But they have not yet figured out how to deal with 
uncertainty.86 Uncertainty allows subjective disagreement. Rational people 
cannot disagree on the probable results of a coin toss, but they can disagree 
about whether Apple will thrive or fail without Steve Jobs.87 Uncertainty and 
disagreement make the task of valuing an ongoing business venture 
notoriously difficult and subjective. This is evidenced by the variety of 
different and competing valuation techniques—book value, discounted cash 
flow, earnings multiples, etc.—described in finance texts.88 Each technique, 
moreover, requires the person doing the valuation to make numerous 
assumptions. Are earnings better described by EBIT or EBITDA? Will 
profits increase, decrease, or remain steady? What discount rate should be 
 
additional reasons why we should apply a lower discount rate to future corporate profits than we 
would apply to future payments received by an individual. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 786-91. 
84 The distinction is often attributed to economist Frank Knight. See FRANK F. KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921) (“Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct 
from the familiar notion of [r]isk.”). 
85 See generally Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151 (1977). 
86 See generally NASSIM N. TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2007) (observing that “in spite of our 
progress and the growth in knowledge, or perhaps because of such progress and growth, the future 
will be increasingly less predictable”). 
87 See Miller, supra note 85, at 1151 (“[T]he very concept of uncertainty implies that reasonable 
men may differ in their forecasts.”); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, 
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 710 (1995) (“We live in a world of 
ignorance and uncertainty . . . . In the case of stock markets, any analysis that ignores ignorance 
risks being incomplete indeed.”). 
88 See generally BENNINGA & SARIG, supra note 83 (discussing various valuation techniques 
and their relative merits). 
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applied? Uncertainty allows even experts to disagree in their answers. And 
the further they try to look into the future, the murkier the future becomes. 
The reality of uncertainty undermines the claim that demanding corporate 
directors and executives maximize long-term shareholder value somehow adds 
clarity or rigor to the messy business of gauging whether managers are doing a 
good job. Once we attempt to attach any number other than today’s market price 
to a company’s shares, the number becomes subject to disagreement and 
manipulation. The CEO claims her chosen business strategy will maximize 
shareholder value “in the long run”; the activist hedge fund manager argues his 
proposed restructuring will better “unlock shareholder value.” There is no way to 
prove who is correct. Both claims are unfalsifiable until the future arrives. 
This means that, far from supplying an objective metric for holding 
corporate managers accountable, “long-term shareholder value” may provide 
no observable metric at all. The concept simply cannot perform the function 
that supposedly justifies it as a theory of corporate purpose. It cannot provide 
a way to objectively assess managerial performance. So, what remains of the 
case for shareholder value theory? 
A diehard defender of shareholder value as the corporate maximand might 
reply that, whatever its weaknesses, long-term shareholder value remains the 
best possible corporate objective because it is better to use an imperfect tool 
than no tool at all.89 This argument presupposes that shareholder value theory 
is, in fact, the only tool available to monitor corporate performance and hold 
managers accountable. In the next Part we challenge this presupposition. We 
argue that an alternative tool for assessing corporate performance—one that 
honors the complexities of corporations and board decisionmaking, and allows 
for better managerial accountability and monitoring—is indeed available. 
That alternative is systems thinking. 
II. THE SYSTEMS ALTERNATIVE 
A. What Is Systems Theory? 
Systems theory is a design and performance assessment methodology 
routinely used in many fields, including engineering, biology, computer science, 
and (significantly) management science.90 Some readers may nevertheless find 
 
89 It is worth noting that, as a matter of logic, this is not necessarily true: If the only treatment 
for a disease is a drug whose side effects are worse than the symptoms it relieves, then it would be 
better to leave the disease untreated. 
90 See generally FRITJOF CAPRA & PIER L. LUISI, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF LIFE (2014); 
DRAPER L. KAUFFMAN, SYSTEMS ONE (1980); JAMSHID GHARAJEDAGHI, SYSTEMS THINKING 
(1999) (applying systems theory to business architecture and management); DEREK K. HITCHENS, 
ADVANCED SYSTEMS THINKING, ENGINEERING, AND MANAGEMENT (2003) (surveying the 
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the term esoteric, in part because experts in each of these areas often apply 
systems thinking without explicating its general principles and tend to employ 
their own unique vocabulary.91 For example, systems theory goes by the name 
of cybernetics in controls engineering; systems analysis in computer 
programming; medicine in human biology; and operations analysis in 
management research. Moreover, few texts describe basic principles outside of 
some highly specialized context (e.g., safety engineering or evolutionary 
biology).92 Nevertheless, whatever the field, certain basic principles are 
employed to design, assess, and improve the performance of any system. 
What, then, is a “system”? A system has been defined as any set of distinct 
but interconnected elements or parts that operate as a unified whole to serve a 
function or purpose.93 Consider, for example, the humble coffee machine. Its 
different parts—filter, water reservoir, heating element, coffee pot—are distinct, 
but operate together for the purpose of brewing coffee. The human body also is 
a system. Its elements include the lungs, circulatory system, musculature, 
skeletal frame, etc. Each is distinct, but the elements interact with each other to 
function as a unified organism. In contrast, pebbles randomly scattered along 
the street do not constitute a system. They are not interconnected, nor do they 
form a cohesive whole that serves a particular function or purpose. 94 
Systems accordingly have certain core characteristics: (1) they consist of 
distinct elements; (2) these elements are coordinated and interconnected; and 
(3) the elements operate as a unified whole to serve a given function or 
purpose.95 In addition, a fourth core characteristic of systems implicit in the 
literature, and of critical importance for our discussion, is (4) systems 
perform their function or purpose over time. The coffee machine, it is hoped, 
will brew coffee not only today, but tomorrow.96 
 
application of systems theory in various professional fields); DONELLA H. MEADOWS, THINKING 
IN SYSTEMS (Diana Wright ed., 2008); Lynn M. LoPucki, Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 479 (1997) (applying systems theory to legal systems). 
91 See KAUFFMAN, supra note 90, at 1 (observing systems theory “has revolutionized many fields of 
science and has had an enormous impact on all our lives, even though most people have never heard of it”). 
92 An exception can be found in an accessible guide written by biochemist Donella Meadows. 
See MEADOWS, supra note 90. Another useful introductory text is KAUFFMAN, supra note 90. 
93 See MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 11; see also KAUFFMAN, supra note 90, at 1 (“A system is a 
collection of parts which interact with each other to function as a whole.”). 
94 Following Meadows’ convention, we will generally use the word “function” to refer to 
nonhuman, evolved systems and the word “purpose” to refer to designed systems. As Meadows 
notes, and as is arguably the case with corporations, “many systems have both human and nonhuman 
elements.” MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 15. 
95 Elements can be tangible or intangible. MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 13. For example, a 
senior executive’s knowledge and experience may be an important element of a corporate system. 
96 Meadows offers the following approach for differentiating between systems and things that are 
(in Meadows’ words) “a bunch of stuff.” Id. at 13. First, determine whether one can identify the parts. 
Id. If yes, then determine whether the parts affect each other. Id. Third, determine whether “the parts 
together produce an effect that is different from the effect of each part on its own.” Id. We would add 
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Systems take many forms. Some systems, such as the coffee machine, are 
designed. Other systems, like organisms, evolve. Still other systems are 
hybrids that are both designed and evolved. Examples of hybrid systems 
include “artificial life” computer programs97 and (as we explore in greater 
detail below) many business corporations.98 
For while systems theory currently is not a staple of contemporary 
corporate law and governance discussions, we believe it is especially well-
suited to the tasks of designing, assessing, and improving the performance of 
business firms, especially those structured as corporations. Just as a coffee 
machine can be viewed as a system, so too can a company. Business 
corporations consist of separate yet interconnected elements, including human 
capital (employees, executives, directors), financial capital (funds raised from 
operations and from equity and debt investors), and physical capital (plant and 
equipment, inventory). Each element is distinct and serves a distinct purpose. 
For example, directors and officers supply managerial expertise; employees 
supply labor; the physical plant produces goods for sale; and financial capital 
purchases the labor and raw materials needed to produce more goods. These 
elements do not exist in isolation vis-à-vis each other. They are interconnected, 
influencing each other in ways that allow them to operate as a unified whole, 
separate and apart from their individual selves. This unified whole performs 
several useful functions: generating goods and services, investment returns, 
and tax revenues. Finally, it performs these functions over time. Indeed, an 
incorporated entity in theory can operate in perpetuity.99 
Accordingly, thinking of a company as a system can help us better 
understand the nature of corporations, their purpose, and the best way to 
measure and improve their performance. We explore how below. We start by 
identifying some basic principles of systems theory and examining what those 
principles teach about the nature of firms. We then consider what systems 
theory tells us about the question of corporate purpose. Finally, we discuss 
what can be learned from systems theory about ways to measure and improve 
corporate performance and to hold corporate managers accountable. 
 
a fourth step: consider whether the effect produced persists “over time . . . in a variety of 
circumstances.” Id. Meadows was a MacArthur Foundation genius award recipient and lead author of 
the bestseller, The Limits to Growth. DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). 
97 See Luc Steels, The Artificial Life Roots of Artificial Intelligence, in ARTIFICIAL LIFE 75, 77 
(Christopher G. Langton ed., 1995) (discussing the creation of computer programs which are capable 
of learning from the surrounding environment). 
98 See infra Section II.B. 
99 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (2015) (giving perpetual existence to a 
corporation); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(a)(9) (McKinney 2017) (requiring that the certificate of 
incorporation include “[t]he duration of the corporation if other than perpetual”). 
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B. Systems Theory and the Nature of the Corporation 
Perhaps the first and most fundamental principle in systems theory is that 
systems are more than the sum of their parts. The individual pieces of a coffee 
machine, left lying about, do nothing. It is only when these pieces are 
connected and fitted together properly, and interact with and affect each 
other, that the machine can brew coffee. 
This principle applies straightforwardly to business corporations. The 
individual elements that comprise the corporation—physical assets, 
intellectual capital, financial resources, labor—perform quite differently when 
disconnected and disaggregated from each other, than when they are 
coordinated with each other through the corporate entity. A pile of money, 
sitting alone, does nothing. It is only when investors’ money is combined and 
coordinated with intellectual capital, physical capital, and human capital that 
the money can generate additional wealth for investors (along with goods, 
services, employment opportunities, and innovations).100 The firm, like the 
coffee machine and other systems, operates as an integrated whole to perform 
functions that its individual parts cannot perform in isolation.101 
A second fundamental principle of systems thinking is that systems can 
be fractal, in the sense that they can be comprised of subsystems, which, in 
turn, are comprised of other subsystems, and so on, ad infinitum.102 
Conversely, a system typically can also be described as a subsystem of another 
larger system. Thus, a human being is comprised of organs, which are 
comprised of cells, which are comprised of protein molecules, etc. At the same 
time, an individual can be viewed as part of a family, which is part of a 
community, which is part of a nation, and so forth. To keep the amount of 
information needed to make decisions within manageable bounds,103 systems 
thinkers typically order systems into hierarchies. When a system can be 
 
100 This is why corporate production often presents what economists call a “team production” 
scenario. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 21. 
101 As Meadows observes: 
[T]here is an integrity or wholeness about a system and an active set of mechanisms 
to maintain that integrity. Systems can change, adapt, respond to events, seek goals, 
mend injuries, and attend to their own survival in lifelike ways, although they may 
contain or consist of nonliving things. Systems can be self-organizing, and often are 
self-repairing over at least some range of disruptions. They are resilient, and many of 
them are evolutionary. 
MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 12. 
102 KAUFFMAN, supra note 90, at 2. 
103 As Meadows explains it, although the boundaries between systems are not real, it is 
acceptable to simplify the analysis this way because “relationships within [systems] are denser and 
stronger than relationships between [systems]” and “[w]hen hierarchies break down, they usually 
split along their subsystem boundaries. Much can be learned by taking apart systems . . . and 
studying them separately.” MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 83. 
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broken down into component subsystems or viewed as a subsystem of a larger 
system, it is essential to identify which level or levels of hierarchy are most 
suitable for analyzing the problem at hand.104 
Again, this lesson applies to corporations. A corporation can be viewed as 
comprised of a number of different subsystems, such as its managerial team; 
its production process and facilities; its marketing team; and its financial 
operations. Each subsystem is comprised of elements that interact with each 
other to perform some sub-purpose, like raising financing, manufacturing 
products, or generating sales. Conversely, a corporation can be viewed as part 
of a larger system (e.g., a corporate conglomerate or a nation’s economy). For 
present purposes—that is, for analyzing the nature, purpose, and best way of 
monitoring the performance of business corporations—we treat the corporate 
entity as the system of interest and the appropriate level of analysis.105 
A third general principle of systems theory that flows from the first and 
second principles is that the overall health and continued functioning of a 
system depends on the continued health and functioning of each of its 
essential subsystems. Each subsystem must work for the whole system to 
work properly, and changes in the elements or relationships of a subsystem 
can affect the system as a whole. If a coffee machine’s heating element breaks, 
for example, the coffee machine can no longer brew coffee. 
Corporations similarly depend on all their subsystems to function. If 
equity or debt investors refuse to supply funds, if employees stop manning 
the production facilities, or if executives mismanage, then the entire 
corporation may soon cease to function. As we discuss in greater detail below, 
this insight from systems thinking has important implications for how we 
should go about the business of measuring corporate performance.106 
A fourth and final lesson from systems theory is that, to fulfill its purpose 
or function, a system must survive. Recall that a basic characteristic of 
systems is that they perform purposes or functions over time. The time period 
necessary to fulfill the system’s purpose or function may be quite short 
(consider the fruit fly), but it may also be quite long. This is especially likely 
 
104 Id. at 84 (“If you have a liver disease, for example, a doctor usually can treat it without 
paying much attention to your heart or your tonsils (to stay on the same hierarchical level) . . . or 
the DNA in the nuclei of the liver cells (to move down several levels).”). 
105 An unwillingness to confine analysis to a manageable level may have contributed to the 
decline of interest in “structural functionalism” in sociology. Structural functionalism, associated with 
theorists like Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton, attempted to apply systems thinking to 
understanding entire societies. See Lopucki, supra note 90, at 483-85 (distinguishing the “systems 
approach to law” from “systems theory, Parsonian functionalism, and related methods of policy 
analysis”). It thus fell into what Meadows has described as the “trap” of “making [systems] boundaries 
too large . . . result[ing] in enormously complicated analyses, which produce piles of information that 
may only serve to obscure the answers to the questions at hand.” MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 98. 
106 See infra Section II.E. 
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in the case of business firms organized as perpetual corporate entities. For 
example, the Hudson’s Bay Company has been operating continuously since 
1670;107 General Electric (a corporate adolescent by comparison) was founded 
in 1892.108 When systems must operate over long periods of time to perform 
their functions or purposes, system survivability—or, to use a more common 
label, sustainability—becomes a desideratum. 
C. Systems and Sustainability 
Systems thinkers accordingly devote considerable attention to questions of 
sustainability. This focus is apparent in the systems literature, which identifies 
multiple strategies to improve the odds a system will survive long enough to 
achieve its intended purpose.109 Because sustainability may be a particularly 
desirable attribute for perpetual entities like corporations, we conclude this 
section by exploring some common sustainability strategies in greater detail. 
One straightforward sustainability mechanism found in many systems is 
redundancy—that is, devoting more resources to some purpose than is 
necessary under current conditions.110 Redundancy is often seen, for example, 
in engineering, where it is common practice to employ backup systems or make 
structures stronger than they need to be. Redundancy is inefficient in a narrow 
sense, as redundant resources seem “wasted” as long as conditions remain 
stable. In an uncertain world, however, conditions may change, and redundant 
resources could prove essential for the system’s survival. This explains why 
redundancy is often seen in organisms—if efficiency were all evolution cared 
about, people would not become overweight, or have two kidneys.111 
A second sustainability mechanism found in many systems is 
homeostasis—that is, information and control feedback loops that allow the 
system to adjust to disturbances in its external environment and stay within 
 
107 See Our History, HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY, https://www2.hbc.com/hbc/history/ [https://
perma.cc/7HHD-FXYP]. 
108 See Thomas Edison & The History Of Electricity, GEN. ELECTRIC, https://www.ge.com/
about-us/history/thomas-edison [https://perma.cc/R5RP-ES6M] (explaining the birth of GE in 1892 
out of the merger of the Edison General Electric Company and the Thomas-Houston Company). 
109 See MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 76-85 (discussing strategies such as “resilience,” “self-
organization,” and “hierarchy” as properties of “highly functioning systems”). 
110 See MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 76 (identifying redundancy as a property of resilient systems). 
111 Put differently, redundancy appears inefficient in a static analysis that presumes conditions 
cannot change. A dynamic analysis that acknowledges uncertainty and the possibility of change 
makes redundancy look more efficient. It might be argued that in perfectly competitive markets 
companies might find it difficult to invest in redundancy just as they might find it difficult to invest 
in innovation. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS 607 (4th ed. 1988) 
(discussing the argument that perfect competition can make innovation difficult). Economists 
recognize, however, that many business firms operate in markets that are not perfectly competitive. 
Id. at 611 (“Most productive activity in the United States, as in any advanced industrial society, can 
be found between the two theoretical poles [of] perfect competition and pure monopoly.”). 
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the parameters necessary for continued functioning.112 For example, the 
dihedral (V-shaped) wings of aircraft provide homeostasis. When a wing dips 
in flight, it tends to rebound. Organisms similarly use feedback loops to 
achieve homeostasis; hunger is a feedback mechanism that prompts an 
organism to eat when running short on calories. Systems theorists have 
something of an obsession with feedback loops, which can be stabilizing 
(“negative” feedback) or destabilizing (“positive” or “runaway” feedback) and 
may have limits or breakdown points.113 Dihedral wings alone are unlikely to 
save an aircraft turned upside down. 
Finally, a third sustainability mechanism found in some systems is the 
capacity for self-organization—the ability for the system itself “to learn, 
diversify, complexify, evolve” in response to shifts in the external 
environment that might otherwise overwhelm the system’s feedback loops 
and threaten the system’s survival.114 For example, birds are warm-blooded, 
but many species do not rely only on homeostasis to avoid freezing; rather, 
they have also evolved the ability to fly south for winter. 
Business firms can, and often do, exhibit redundancy, homeostasis, and 
self-organization. For example, it is common for corporations to employ 
redundancy by maintaining an “equity cushion” (holding more assets than 
necessary to meet liabilities). Financial controls that document rising 
inventories or declining sales figures are homeostatic information feedback loops 
that alert companies when they must reduce production to remain profitable. 
Finally, firms can self-organize by merging, moving to other jurisdictions, or 
amending bylaws and charters to evolve new governance structures (e.g., 
adopting a classified board or a dual class share structure) in response to changes 
in the regulatory or market environment.115 In effect, their legal form “evolves.” 
Companies that embrace these sorts of sustainability mechanisms exhibit 
resilience: the ability to recover and continue functioning after encountering 
 
112 See KAUFFMAN, supra note 90, at 4-12. 
113 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 40 (“Every balancing feedback loop has its breakdown point, 
where other loops pulled the stock away from its goal more strongly than it can pull back.”); see also 
KAUFFMAN, supra note 90, at 13 (“[T]here are limits to the amount and kind of change which any 
active system can deal with.”). 
114 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 79. 
115 See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of 
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1177-80 (2013) (discussing how public 
companies are reorganizing in response to appearance and empowerment of activist investors). Self-
organization allows systems to change, evolve, and sometimes to create whole new structures, 
responding in diverse and complex ways to meet the changing needs of their environments and 
constituents. Innovation, entrepreneurship, and intrapreneurship are all examples of firm self-
organization. See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Contemplating the Gap-Filling Role of Social Intrapreneurship, 
94 OR. L. REV. 67, 73-76 (2015) (contrasting innovators, entrepreneurs, and intrapreneurs but also 
noting their commonalities, including “the ability to innovate and devise new business solutions” 
and “to recognize failed strategies and in response, pivot and retool”). 
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a destabilizing and potentially destructive force.116 Citibank, BP, and 
JPMorgan were each able to recover after unforeseen destabilizing events—
the subprime mortgage crisis, Gulf oil spill, and “London whale” fiasco, 
respectively.117 Enron and Lehman Brothers proved too fragile for the shocks 
they encountered. We discuss the implications of resiliency for corporate 
performance in greater detail in Section II.E. 
In sum, if we think of corporate entities as systems, at least four basic 
principles from systems theory apply to them: (1) the whole of the corporate 
system is more than the sum of its parts; (2) the corporate system can be viewed 
as composed of subsystems and also as part of a larger system, making it essential 
to choose the appropriate level of analysis in decisionmaking; (3) the health of 
the corporate system depends on the health of each of its critical subsystems; 
and (4) to perform over time, the corporate system must be sustainable. 
D. Systems Theory and the Question of Corporate Purpose 
As we have described, systems theory offers a variety of insights to benefit 
our understanding of the nature of corporate entities. But some of the most 
valuable lessons that systems thinking offers corporate law scholarship lies in 
what it teaches about how we might think about corporate purpose. As discussed 
in Part I, for most of the past three decades, experts in the Anglo-American world 
have embraced the notion that business corporations have but one goal: to 
maximize shareholder value.118 Systems thinking, in contrast, offers a very 
different perspective—one that offers support for some of the competing models 
of the corporation surveyed in Section I.A. Systems theory teaches, first and 
foremost, that systems not only can but typically do serve more than one purpose. 
Consider again the coffee machine. One purpose of a coffee machine is, 
obviously, to brew coffee. But anyone designing a coffee machine is likely to 
 
116 See MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 78 (“Systems need to be managed not only for productivity 
or stability, they also need to be managed for resilience—the ability to recover from perturbation, 
the ability to restore or repair themselves.”). 
117 See Jonathan Berr, $7B Penalty Doesn’t End Citigroup’s Legal Woes, CBS NEWS (July 14, 2014, 1:49 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/citigroups-7-billion-penalty-doesnt-end-banks-legal-woes/ [https://
perma.cc/PB78-FV2M] (indicating that Citibank is still performing well despite its role in the financial 
crisis, which resulted in substantial fines); Mary Bottari, JP Morgan Gets an Award for London Whale Fiasco, 
Will Schneiderman Harpoon the Corruption?, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (Mar. 26, 2013, 7:35 AM), 
https://www.prwatch.org/news/2013/03/12033/jp-morgan-gets-award-london-whale-fiasco-will-
schneiderman-harpoon-corruption [https://perma.cc/9SSG-4BWT] (discussing a JPMorgan Chase 
employee accepting “a ‘best crisis management’ award given by an investor relations magazine”); 
Miyoko Sakashita, Four Years After Gulf Oil Spill, BP is Recovering Faster Than Environment, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 26, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miyoko-sakashita/gulf-oil-
spill_b_5036370.html [https://perma.cc/9BWS-5AEM] (noting that four years after the BP Oil 
Spill, “the slate has been largely cleared for BP”). 
118 See supra Section I.B. 
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have other goals in mind as well. In addition to being able to brew coffee, the 
coffee machine also should be energy efficient, have a beautiful design, not be 
too expensive, and not occupy too much counter space. Finally but 
fundamentally, the machine should be durable. As Meadows puts it, “[a]n 
important function of almost every system is to ensure its own perpetuation.”119 
Multiple purposes are the rule, not the exception, in systems. Indeed, it is hard 
to think of any designed system whose designer would not have had more 
than one goal in mind. This naturally raises the question: if even a simple 
coffee machine has multiple purposes, is it not reasonable to believe that a 
system as complex as a corporation also might serve more than one purpose? 
Corporations provide investment returns to shareholders. They also make 
interest payments to debtholders, pay salaries to employees, provide revenues 
to suppliers, pay taxes to governments, provide goods and services to consumers, 
and make technological breakthroughs that benefit future generations. These are 
all legitimate and beneficial outcomes of corporate activity.120 There is no logical 
reason (apart from the accountability argument discussed earlier in Section I.C) 
to choose only one beneficial outcome as important and demote all others.121 
Systems theory accordingly challenges shareholder value theory’s fundamental 
assumption of a singular, uniform corporate goal, and instead supports the view 
that corporate purpose need not be homogenous.122 
At the same time, it inevitably raises the question: how, then, should we 
determine a corporate entity’s purpose? One obvious way to think about the 
purposes of a designed system is in terms of the intentions of the person or 
persons who designed it. The coffee machine, for example might be designed 
to brew coffee quickly and efficiently while looking attractive and occupying 
minimal counter space. The intentions of the coffee machine’s designer 
delineate its purposes. 
Who “designs” corporations? Perhaps most fundamentally, corporate 
entities are designed and created by the states whose laws make incorporation 
possible.123 In this sense systems thinking reinforces the concession/state 
 
119 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 15. 
120 Moreover, to ensure the company will continue to provide these benefits, durability or 
sustainability may itself be a desirable goal for some corporate entities. For an exploration of this 
possibility in greater detail see infra text accompanying notes 138–40. 
121 Systems theory accordingly lends credibility to alternative models of corporate purpose, 
like stakeholder models or team production models, that allow for the possibility of corporations 
serving multiple constituencies. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 21 (discussing the team 
production model); R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New 
Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88 (1993) (discussing the stakeholder model). 
122 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 59, at 35-36 (describing the purpose of 
corporation as whatever contracting parties desire). 
123 See Ciepley, supra note 38, at 140 (describing corporate entities as “franchise governments” 
designed by the state); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
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franchise model of the corporation.124 Beyond the state, however, one might 
also say the corporation is designed by the entrepreneur who drafts and files 
the corporate charter (often with the aid of lawyers who help select the 
charter’s terms).125 In addition, one could say the corporation is designed by 
the individuals who serve as its board of directors and executive team. Finally, 
creating a business corporation usually requires investment capital, which 
comes from equity and debt investors. To the extent the corporation is 
organized to appeal to potential creditors and shareholders, both debt and 
equity investors might be said to participate in its design. It should be 
apparent at this point that the shareholder class is only one, and not 
necessarily the most important, of the many different groups that “design” a 
corporation and participate in it on a voluntary basis, each with its own 
objectives in mind.126 The systems approach consequently echoes many 
elements of the nexus of contracts model of the firm.127 
But inquiring into designers’ intentions may not be the end of the inquiry 
into a designed system’s purpose. A third lesson of systems thinking is that 
even a designed system may surprise us by exhibiting behaviors and 
performing functions that were not intended or anticipated by its designers; 
automobiles are designed for transportation, but also prove unfortunately 
effective at causing injury. Moreover, if a designed system has self-organizing 
features, its functions may change as it evolves. Even in designed systems, 
“[s]ystem purposes need not be human purposes and are not necessarily those 
intended by any single actor within the system.”128 When we observe a 
 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 428-32 (2000) (describing how corporate entities need state law to exist and 
cannot be formed by private contracting). 
124 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
125 See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1301, 1308-11 (2001) (describing the role played by lawyers in setting the terms of corporate charters). 
126 A shareholder value theorist might argue shareholders play the major role because companies need 
to raise funds by selling equity. But as forms of team production, companies also need to attract funds from 
creditors, human capital from executives, employees, and so on. See Blair & Stout, supra note 21 at 250. 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. Because corporations have many designers, their 
intended purpose may vary depending on the intentions of the particular designer in question. As a 
normative matter, when the objectives of different designers clash, which designer’s goals should prevail? 
Like most corporate governance scholarship, this Article adopts the public policy approach of focusing on 
overall social welfare. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 441 (suggesting that “[a]ll thoughtful 
people believe” corporations ought to be run in the interests of society as a whole). From this perspective 
it makes little sense to define corporate purpose only in terms of the intentions of the entrepreneurs who 
start companies, or the executives who run them, or the equity and debt investors who finance them. Our 
concern is with social welfare writ large. This perspective suggests that the corporate designers whose goals 
matter most may be the political states whose laws create and regulate corporate entities. Elsewhere, one 
of the authors has argued that a social welfare analysis of corporate purpose should also take into account 
the welfare of future generations. See Stout, supra note 81, at 685-86 (describing how corporations offer a 
“vehicle” to pass wealth from the present generation to future ones). 
128 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 15. 
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system, we may find the functions it actually performs to be quite different 
from what its designers intended.129 
This insight is consonant with the entity approach to thinking about 
corporations.130 It also has interesting implications for identifying the 
functions of corporations, which are hybrid systems with both designed and 
self-evolved characteristics.131 It recommends that we look at what 
corporations do, not only at what academics, judges, or executives say they do 
or ought to do. The rhetoric of shareholder value peppers the contemporary 
scholarly literature, and can also be found in policy reports and the dicta of some 
judicial opinions.132 Yet business corporations continue to pursue strategies that 
seem clearly inconsistent with maximizing accounting profits or share price: 
rejecting premium takeover bids, adopting poison pills and dual class share 
structures, and resisting activist shareholders’ demands.133 Some defenders of 
shareholder value try to resolve the tension between shareholder value theory and 
corporate behavior by speculating that such strategies must maximize shareholder 
wealth in the (conveniently unobservable) “long run.”134 Others acknowledge the 
gap between theory and practice by asserting that managers are running amok, 
and corporate law must be reformed to constrain them.135 Systems theory does 
not directly answer the question of whether the gap between shareholder value 
theory and actual corporate behavior is a good thing or bad thing. It does, 
however, caution us to pay close attention to the difference. 
 
129 This is not always a bad thing. Systems can surprise us in good ways. For example, Cynthia 
Estlund has argued that large corporations, by bringing together employees from a wide range of 
backgrounds, break down racial, ethnic, and religious barriers, and promote greater social 
integration. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER (2003). 
130  Recall, for instance, Justice Brandeis’s description of the corporation as a “Frankenstein 
monster.” See supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
131 See STOUT, supra note 45, at 28 (stating that an “overwhelming majority of corporate 
charters simply state that the corporation’s purpose is to do anything ‘lawful’”). 
132 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra text accompanying notes 200–03. 
134 Millon, supra note 70, at 1017 (stating that business managers may consider the interests of 
“non-shareholding constituencies” to survive in the long run); see, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, How 
Costco Became the Anti-Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/
business/yourmoney/how-costco-became-the-antiwalmart.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/L5EL-
P5FW] (citing Costco’s CEO as stating that “[o]n Wall Street, they’re in the business of making 
money between now and next Thursday . . . we can’t take that view. We want to build a company 
that will still be here 50 and 60 years from now.”); James B. Stewart, Amazon Says Long Term and 
Means It, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/business/at-amazon-jeff-
bezos-talks-long-term-and-means-it.html?mcubz=3 [https://nyti.ms/2jS6jHw] (noting how 
Amazon’s CEO issued a manifesto stating “[i]t’s all about the long term,” explaining why Amazon 
is willing to forsake profits by investing in long-term growth and customer satisfaction). 
135 See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 70; Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 70.  
See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013) (claiming that board insulation from shareholders does not support 
companies’ long-term interests). 
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Finally, systems theory teaches that what we observe about a system’s 
apparent purpose will depend on our level of analysis—what level in the system 
hierarchy are we looking at? Systems are made up of subsystems, and 
subsystems have subpurposes that can be at odds with the system’s overall 
purpose. The purpose of the human circulatory system is to move blood; the 
purpose of the human skin is to contain the other organs of the body. If the 
skin is breached and the circulatory system continues to move blood, you might 
bleed to death. It is important not to focus only on promoting the purpose of a 
single subsystem if we care about the functioning of the system as a whole.136 
When a single subsystem’s goals dominate, overall system function can suffer. 
Thus a fourth and, we believe, critical lesson that systems thinking offers 
on corporate purpose is that the overall purposes or goals of the corporate 
system should not be subordinated to the goals of one of its subsystems. This 
observation cautions against placing exclusive emphasis on the goals of 
shareholders, as shareholder value theory recommends.137 Issuing equity 
shares allows corporations to obtain financial capital at certain points in time 
(although debt and retained profits often are more important sources of 
funding).138 Shareholders may perform other useful functions as well, 
including serving as a check on agency costs. It is important to remember, 
however, that the share ownership system is only part of the larger corporate system. 
There are other corporate subsystems that matter, including the subsystems 
that produce the goods and services the corporation sells, the subsystems that 
market these goods and services to customers, the subsystems that manage 
the corporation’s employees, and so forth. The goals of the shareownership 
system and the goals of the company’s current shareholders—many of whom 
expect to hold their shares for only a short period of time—are not necessarily 
the goals of the corporate entity as a whole. And for the systems thinker, 
“[k]eeping sub-purposes and overall system purposes in harmony is an 
essential function of successful systems.”139 
In exploring systems theory’s implications, we do not claim to offer a 
definitive answer to the difficult question of corporate purpose. Indeed, one of 
the primary insights of systems thinking is that the purpose and functions of a 
system can be the “least obvious part of the system,”140 especially to outside 
 
136 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 84-85. 
137 See supra Section II.B (discussing the advantages of viewing the corporation as a system of 
interests and the corporation not prioritizing one specific interest). 
138 JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY 26 (6th ed. 2007). 
139 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 16. 
140 Id. at 16-17. 
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observers who pay attention to only a few events or to “rhetoric or stated goals.”141 
Different corporations can have different sets of purposes, and perceptions of 
purpose can vary depending on the perspective of the participant in the system 
and on the level of analysis.142 In other words, systems theory treats system 
purpose as complex, fluid, and to some degree dependent on the observer’s 
perspective. In this regard it resembles relativity theory, which treats physical 
reality as complex, fluid, and dependent on the observer’s perspective. The 
analogy may be instructive. For just as in physics it is sometimes necessary to 
take relativity theory into account to avoid costly mistakes,143 it can be necessary 
to use systems theory to avoid costly mistakes about corporate purpose. 
Systems theory accordingly carries several obvious and important 
implications for contemporary corporate governance scholarship. First, 
shareholder value theory demands corporations pursue a single, uniform 
objective. Systems thinking embraces the possibility of multiple objectives. 
Second, shareholder value theory presumes the desires of the corporation’s 
current shareholders should determine what corporations are designed to do.144 
Systems theory acknowledges that corporate purpose can be viewed from 
different perspectives, including the desires of the state whose laws made 
incorporation possible in the first place. Third, shareholder value theory 
conflicts with much observed corporate behavior. Systems thinking explains 
why companies often eschew opportunities to “maximize” current profits or 
share price. Finally, shareholder value theory focuses obsessively on promoting 
the goals of the shareholding subsystem, while ignoring the goals of the 
corporate system as a whole. As we explore in greater detail in Part III, systems 
theory explains why this approach—which in recent decades has encouraged 
 
141 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 164–68 (describing advantages insiders enjoy in 
assessing corporate performance). 
142 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 59, at 35-36 (“An approach that emphasizes the 
contractual nature of a corporation removes from the field of interesting questions one that has plagued 
many writers: what is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly 
defined? Is there anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to maximize profit 
over the long run or the short run? Our response to such questions is: who cares? . . . The role of corporate 
law here, as elsewhere, is to adopt a background term that prevails unless varied by contract.”). 
143 For example, the global positioning system (GPS) must take account of the theory of relativity 
because atomic clocks on satellites in orbit experience time more slowly relative to clocks on the surface of the 
earth. See Neil Ashby, Relativity and the Global Positioning System, PHYSICS TODAY, May 2002, at 41, https://
www.uam.es/personal_pdi/ciencias/jcuevas/Teaching/GPS_relativity.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP8G-XNTC]. 
144 It also assumes that equity investors’ sole interest is in making as much money as possible, 
without regard for ethics or for impact on stakeholders and third parties. This is a questionable 
assumption in many cases. Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237, 255-68 
(2015) (stating that most shareholders of new public companies adopt takeover defenses, even though 
they generate lower share prices, because they are invested in the company’s legacy); STOUT, supra 
note 45, at 95-103 (providing support for shareholder prosociality). 
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numerous federal regulatory interventions into traditional state corporate 
law—has proven not only ineffective, but very possibly destructive.145 
E. Systems Theory and the Problem of Measuring Corporate Performance 
In Part I, we discussed competing models of the corporate form and the 
rise of shareholder value theory as the dominant Anglo-American narrative. 
We then showed how intellectual justifications for shareholder value theory 
have shifted over the decades. Today, the theory is grounded primarily on the 
idea that shareholder value provides a single, quantifiable metric that can be 
used to hold directors and executives accountable. As we also showed in Part 
I, however, when shareholder value is gauged only by short-term financial 
metrics, it can produce pathological results, and when it is interpreted to 
mean long-term shareholder value, it no longer offers that desired 
accountability. What, then, can? 
Systems thinking may offer a more promising solution to the problem of 
measuring corporate performance. This idea may seem counterintuitive, for 
systems theory acknowledges that corporate purpose need not be monolithic 
and that different companies may have different purposes. Yet as we will 
show, this fundamentally contractarian approach does not equate to a move 
toward chaos. Rather, it is a move toward reality, and an embrace of the utility 
of the corporate form. Uncertainty makes it impossible to measure a 
company’s future performance perfectly. However, systems thinking allows 
us to gauge current performance and sustainability reasonably well, without 
risking the damage that can follow from emphasizing share price or 
accounting profits to the exclusion of all other corporate concerns. 
Let us return to the concept of multiple purposes. Modern shareholder 
value theory teaches that companies should “maximize” one particular 
purpose (shareholder returns) to the exclusion of others. Yet business firms 
provide a wide range of social benefits: useful goods and services, 
employment opportunities, tax revenues, and technological innovations, 
along with investment returns not only to shareholders but also to 
bondholders and other creditors. There are many possible different mixes of 
benefits any particular company might produce, and no obvious policy reason 
(beyond broader social welfare concerns146) to prefer one mix over another. 
Moreover, systems theory underscores how a business corporation can have 
many “designers” whose contributions can be essential to the enterprise’s 
success, including the company’s founders; its directors, executives, 
 
145 See infra Section III.C. 
146 For example, in times of high unemployment we might want companies to focus on 
providing jobs; in times of slow growth, to emphasize investment and research. During World War 
II, corporate resources were redirected to providing military goods and services. 
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employees, shareholders and lenders; and the state whose law makes 
incorporation possible.147 Each has unique goals and interests. Systems 
thinking accordingly supports a contractarian approach that treats corporate 
purpose as flexible, multifaceted, and driven by the purposes of those who 
create and participate in the enterprise. 
The likelihood of multiple goals emphasizes the importance of taking 
account of multiple factors in gauging corporate performance. Examples 
might include customer satisfaction and product quality survey results, such 
as those provided by J.D. Power;148 employee retention rates and satisfaction 
surveys such as those offered by Gallup Workplace;149 credit ratings by ratings 
agencies like S&P and Moody’s;150 and a host of other measures such as sales, 
margins, inventory levels, borrowing costs, and so forth. Consulting 
companies like Bain and McKinsey are eager to offer their own performance 
assessments and advice.151 And frameworks are being developed, like the 
Ceres Roadmap for Sustainability, that integrate a more fulsome set of 
“inputs, costs, and externalities” with the aim of providing more meaningful 
assessments of corporate performance.152 
While quantifiable performance metrics beyond share price are readily 
available, the systems approach strongly cautions against applying the same 
metrics to all firms at all times. One cannot simply assume what goal or 
business strategy is “best” for any particular company. The company’s purpose 
depends to some extent on the observer: shareholders might think the 
company should pay more dividends; creditors might think the company 
should build more equity to reduce risk; executives might think the company 
should invest more in developing new products; the state might think the 
business should pay more taxes. When different groups hold different views 
of company purpose, there is room for subjective disagreement about how well 
the company is being managed. Systems thinking accepts this disagreement, 
 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 123–126. 
148 See, e.g., J.D. POWER, http://www.jdpower.com/about [https://perma.cc/5CC9-HW2Z] 
(describing the company’s work in providing clients with customer feedback). 
149 See, e.g., GALLUP Q12 EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT SURV., https://q12.gallup.com/
public/en-us/Features [https://perma.cc/YJB5-SBNE] (describing Gallup employee surveys). 
150 See STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/what-we-do [https://
perma.cc/K8MH-WRSX] (describing the company’s work in assigning credit ratings to companies based on 
key risk factors impacting their financial health); MOODY’S, https://www.moodys.com/Pages/atc.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/F7TE-A3J7] (describing the company’s broad analytics services). 
151 See, e.g., BAIN & COMPANY, http://www.bain.com [https://perma.cc/NP9Y-4B5Z] 
(describing the company’s advisory services); MCKINSEY & COMPANY, www.mckinsey.com/about-
us/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/D8EF-T5SU] (describing the company’s work in advising clients 
across a range of challenges, including strategic, operational, and industry-specific issues). 
152 ANDREA MOFFAT ET AL., THE 21ST CENTURY CORPORATION 3 (2010), 
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/Ceres_Roadmap_for_Sustainability_2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7SSG-UCGE]. 
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counseling against a rigid, “top-down” strategy that attempts to impose a 
single objective on all business corporations. Like the nexus of contract 
approach, it rejects central planning in favor of diversity and self-organization. 
At the same time, it seems reasonable to believe that most system 
participants will view system perpetuation—preserving the system’s ability 
to successfully perform its desired functions on an ongoing basis—as an 
important, if not necessarily exclusive, objective for business firms 
incorporated as perpetual entities.153 A corollary is that those who create, 
manage, and participate in companies view resilience (a firm’s ability to 
survive and continue functioning in the face of change) as an important, if 
often implicit, firm goal.154 Sometimes it is an explicit goal. Even diehard 
defenders of shareholder value theory concede banks should be not only 
profitable, but stable and sound.155 
When perpetuation is an important system goal, systems theorists pay 
close attention to what they call “constraints”: the limits beyond which the 
system’s sustainability mechanisms can no longer protect the system.156 
Typically this involves identifying the parameters that the system and its 
essential subsystems must stay within to function. For example, a coffee 
machine’s heating element must receive a certain minimum amount of 
electrical current but not excessive voltage; its reservoir system must be 
supplied with a certain amount of water, but not too much; it must be subject 
to the normal force of gravity, but not ten g’s of gravitational force. This 
approach is quite different from selecting a single variable and attempting to 
 
153 At some point, risk of failure may be acceptable if it helps the system achieve other desirable 
goals. For example, an engineer might want to design a reliable car, but recognize that if the car has 
too many backup systems it might become unaffordable. Moreover, because the future is uncertain, 
it may be impossible to anticipate all the shocks the system could encounter. Even the most reliable 
car might fail if struck by an asteroid. Thus, while survival is a likely corporate objective, it is 
probably not the only objective. 
154 Thus systems theory teaches that a manager concerned about firm survival should look to see 
whether the company has sustainability strategies in place (e.g., redundancy, homeostasis, self-organization, 
see supra text accompanying notes 109–117) and assess whether they are sufficient to ensure firm survival in 
the face of likely future events. This might involve identifying sustainability mechanisms; establishing their 
limits or constraints (the points at which they might be overwhelmed and cease to protect the system’s 
functioning); and attempting to identify the sorts of future shocks the system might encounter. 
155 See, e.g, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 255, 
247-49 (2009) (arguing that corporate governance “reforms” that empower shareholders cannot 
prevent excessive bank risktaking). Systems thinking is implicit in the work of financial authorities 
like the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which seeks to ensure that financial 
institutions remain stable and sound. It is standard practice for these authorities to refer to the 
banking sector as “the financial system” and to use “stress testing” (or scenario analysis, discussed 
infra note 157) to assess the sustainability of large financial companies. See Mario Quagliarello, 
STRESS TESTING THE BANKING SYSTEM, at xxi (2009) (noting that “macroeconomic stress tests 
are increasingly considered as the basic, indispensable tool of any systematic effort to reduce the 
likelihood and impact of crisis events”). 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 110–119 (discussing sustainability mechanisms). 
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“maximize” it.157 Yet it can be straightforwardly applied to companies. Just 
like other systems, firms must operate within constraints to survive: to remain 
functioning, the typical company must retain a certain number of employees, 
must invest a certain amount in marketing and developing new products, and 
must provide returns to debt and equity investors sufficient to keep them 
happy without disgorging so much cash that it cannot pay its employees or 
develop new products. Sustainability requires that the company stay within 
these constraints, even if the external environment changes.158 
For when systems operate under conditions of uncertainty, the external 
environment will change. And when circumstances change, subsystems that 
were once essential to the system’s survival can become unnecessary or 
redundant. Perhaps a product line becomes obsolete, or new technologies 
change reduction methods so fewer employees are required. At this point, a 
healthy system may reorganize, and “prune off” unnecessary elements and 
subsystems that drain resources. 
As this discussion makes clear, managing an intricate system like a 
business corporation is a complex and difficult job. Luckily, companies 
typically generate a wealth of potentially useful feedback information for 
managers: sales trends, employee turnover, investment expenditures, 
borrowing costs, inventory changes, and customer satisfaction surveys, along 
with accounting profits and (for public companies) stock price. And systems 
theory offers a suite of techniques for using such data to assess and improve 
a company’s progress towards multiple goals while keeping the firm within 
its constraints. The process goes by different labels depending on the field in 
which it is applied (e.g., system analysis in computer science, operations 
analysis in engineering, finance, and management).159 Whatever the field, the 
goal is “optimization,” a phrase that accepts the possibility of multiple 
 
157 Among other things, it requires systems thinkers to recognize and address the critical elements 
of time and uncertainty. They have developed a number of techniques to do this. Time graphs, for 
example, extrapolate system behavior over time given certain assumptions about initial conditions. 
MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 20. Another common methodology often used by engineers, military 
analysts, and financial regulators is scenario analysis, which models the likely effects of alternative future 
events on the system with the goal of identifying circumstances that might cause the system to fail. 
JEROME BRACKEN & GARTH P. MCCORMICK, RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORP., SELECTED 
APPLICATIONS OF NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING 16-19 (1968) (describing the methodology of applying 
“the sequential unconstrained minimization technique for nonlinear programming”). 
158 As this discussion suggests, systems thinking is congruent with the managerial principle of 
“satisficing” developed by Nobel Prize–winning economist Herbert Simon. See Herbert A. Simon, Rationality 
as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 8 (1978) (describing the gap that can exist between 
a situation and managers’ perception of the situation when making decisions). 
159 See generally SYSTEM THEORY (Theodore E. Djaferis & Irvin C. Schick eds., 2000); What 
is Operations Research?, CORNELL ENGINEERING OPERATIONS RES. & INFO. ENGINEERING, 
http://www.orie.cornell.edu/about/whatis.cfm [https://perma.cc/9D3B-2QSN]. 
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objectives in a way that “maximization” cannot.160 For example, nonlinear 
programming is a staple of systems analysis that acknowledges the 
importance of protecting resilience by keeping the system within relevant 
constraints. The use of multiobjective functions is also common.161 Such 
mathematical techniques can be combined with scenario analysis, queuing 
theory, stochastic analysis, network analysis, time graphs, and other arcana of 
operational research to identify ways to measure and improve a company’s 
ability to achieve its intended objectives while preserving sustainability.162 In 
fact, corporate managers routinely apply these techniques when making 
decisions about financing, manufacturing, and supply chain management.163 
Understanding how systems theorists measure and improve the 
performance of complex systems with multiple objectives (machines, 
production processes, software programs) offers at least two insights into how 
to go about measuring overall corporate performance. First and perhaps most 
obviously, systems thinking counsels against focusing on any single goal or 
metric. Raising next quarter’s profits by cutting valuable employees or 
eliminating customer support can lead to long-term disaster. Profits are not 
so much an objective as a constraint the firm must meet to stay in business. In 
this sense, systems theory incorporates elements of shareholder value theory 
by recognizing profitability as an essential constraint to be considered in 
corporate decisionmaking. In contrast to shareholder value theory, however, 
the systems approach does not focus on profits alone, and does not direct 
managers to try to maximize them. Indeed, as we demonstrated in Section 
I.C, it makes no sense to talk about “maximizing” such a number when the 
corporation is intended to operate into an indefinite future, and the sum of 
its profits over time is unobservable.164 Metrics like profits, employee 
 
160 See, e.g., V. BHASKAR ET AL., APPLICATIONS OF MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION IN 
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING 5 (2011), http://www.eng.uwo.ca/people/aray/Ajay%20Publications%20PDF%
20files/A23%20Bhsakar_Rev_ChemE%202000.pdf [https://perma.cc/L53A-FETW] (describing the 
concept of optimization as it applies to chemical engineering). 
161 Id. at 41. A typical example of a multiobjective function might be a weighted average of 
desired goals. For example, corporate managers might be asked to optimize a weighted average of 
profits, revenue growth, consumer satisfaction, and R&D spending. It is important to bear in mind 
that optimization typically takes place within constraints—that is, within the limits identified as 
necessary to keep the system functioning. Trying to increase the weighted average through strategies 
that threaten the system’s long-term survival is to be avoided. Moreover, the weights assigned to the 
different objectives are, to at least some extent, subjective. 
162 Academics Overview, PRINCETON U. OPERATIONS RES. & FIN. ENGINEERING, http://
orfe.princeton.edu/academics [https://perma.cc/NVA8-R369] (describing operational research methods). 
163 See, e.g., What Operations Research Is, OPERATIONAL RES.: SCI. BETTER, http://
www.scienceofbetter.org/what/index.htm [https://perma.cc/49UG-NA3J] (describing management 
uses of operations research). Similarly, financial regulators use “stress testing” to assess the stability 
and sustainability of large financial companies. See Quagliarello, supra note 155 (discussing bank 
regulators’ use of operations research techniques in bank stress testing). 
164 See supra Section I.C (discussing the unobservability of “long term shareholder value”). 
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turnover, customer satisfaction surveys, supplier costs, research budgets, and 
so forth are not ends in themselves. Rather, they are sources of information about 
whether the company is healthy and resilient, and likely to continue to 
generate multiple benefits into the future. It is to this goal, first and foremost, 
we may wish to hold managers “accountable.” 
A corollary to this first insight is that to remain resilient, companies must 
maintain harmony between overarching system goals and subsystem goals. 
There is danger in focusing too much on improving one subsystem’s 
performance at the expense of another’s. Maximizing a coffee machine’s 
output leads to system failure if it causes the machine to overheat and break 
down, while maximizing the machine’s energy efficiency by turning off the 
heating element leads to system failure in the form of cold, weak coffee. 
Similarly, maximizing a company’s current profits by cutting research and 
development expenditures can eventually cause the firm to fail for lack of new 
products, just as maximizing R&D expenditures at the expense of 
profitability can lead to a different kind of failure. Systems theory treats the 
health and functioning of a system’s essential subsystems’ elements as 
incommensurables. Constraints must be respected if the system is to survive. 
A second important insight from systems thinking is that parties outside 
of the corporation will generally not be in the best position to judge corporate 
performance. Given the reality of multiple goals, variation among firms, and 
tremendous complexity inherent in any corporate system, “outsiders” like 
courts, regulators, and professors will rarely be well-positioned to judge 
whether a particular company is performing well or poorly. It is those 
involved in the business, such as customers, employees, investors, and 
executives, who are in the far better position to make such an assessment, and 
whose behavior is likely to provide the most useful feedback.165 This 
observation provides additional support for a contractarian approach to 
corporate governance and state corporate law’s business judgement 
doctrine.166 It also, importantly, has strong implications for the modern trend 
in corporate scholarship and shareholder activism to push for “reforms” that 
supposedly improve corporate governance, such as “destaggering” boards, 
tying director or executive pay to share price, separating the CEO and board 
 
165 The temptation for outside observers to claim significant and perhaps superior ability to 
judge corporate performance may explain why some lawmakers and corporate governance advisors 
have embraced shareholder value thinking despite its obvious limitations. See STOUT, supra note 45, 
at 19-21 (noting that lawmakers’ preferences for shareholder value generated numerous 
developments in corporate law and practice in the 1990s and 2000s). 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 36–37 (describing the contractarian understanding of 
corporations), and infra text accompanying note 191 (discussing the business judgment rule). 
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chair positions, and so forth.167 Systems theory teaches that it will be near-
impossible for outsiders like academics or regulators to identify a strategy 
that can reliably improve the performance of all companies at all times. 
Attempts to impose such generic, silver-bullet solutions are likely to result in 
what Roberta Romano has pithily described as “quack corporate governance” 
that does more harm than good.168 
How, then, can corporate managers be held accountable? In part, the answer 
lies in recognizing that, like many systems, companies have homeostatic 
feedback loops that provide managers with both the information and the 
incentive to keep the firm and its essential subsystems operating within the 
parameters necessary to ensure continued functioning.169 To survive, a business 
firm must be able to please customers well enough to keep sales stable or 
growing, satisfy employees enough to keep turnover within reasonable bounds, 
satisfy debt and equity investors enough to raise financing at a reasonable cost 
when needed, satisfy talented executives enough to retain them, and satisfy 
taxing authorities and regulators enough to avoid costly sanctions. And, of 
course, it must make sufficient profits to do all these things and stay in business. 
Another part of the answer lies in acknowledging and accepting that 
systems techniques will rarely allow us to gauge whether a company is being 
run perfectly. Managers inevitably will retain some “wriggle room” to claim 
they are performing well overall, even when some performance measure like 
quarterly profits is in decline. Their wriggle room is limited, however. 
Whatever mix of functions we believe a company should perform, it can only 
perform those functions while it survives. When relevant metrics stray too 
far outside the parameters necessary for corporate sustainability—when 
profits become losses—it becomes apparent that something is amiss. 
 
167 See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 648, 691 (1995) (arguing that making outside directors equity holders of a company 
promotes effective and efficient management); Elizabeth G. Olson, Why the CEO–Chair Split 
Matters, FORTUNE (Mar. 12, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/03/12/why-the-ceo-chair-split-matters 
[https://perma.cc/9KZQ-8EDM] (discussing shareholder activist calls for splitting chairman and 
CEO positions to decrease conflicts of interest); Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against 
Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-
against-staggered-boards/ [https://perma.cc/8CTY-EFC8] (highlighting a recent trend in the 
general decline of the staggered board in public companies). 
168 See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005). 
169 Firm survival is likely to be an objective for many of those who manage firms, including 
directors who presumably want to keep their positions. See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 315 
(“[D]irectors have an interest in serving their corporate constituents well if (as seems plausible) they 
enjoy and want to keep their positions.”). It is also an objective for executives and employees, who 
may have invested significantly in firm-specific human capital. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 59, at 37 (“Employees may be investors in the sense that portions of their human capital 
are firm-specific . . . .”); Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 276 n.61 (“Rank-and-file employees make 
firm-specific investments when they acquire company-specific skills . . . .”). 
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Accordingly, while a systems approach does not necessarily allow observers 
to determine whether a company is performing at its best, it does often allow 
them to gauge whether managers are doing a better job or a worse one. It thus 
offers a better methodology for promoting managerial accountability than the 
subjective, unobservable criterion of “long-term shareholder value.” The 
strategy is hardly perfect. But when it comes to assessing performance, the 
illusory perfection of shareholder value may be the enemy of the good of 
thriving, socially beneficial corporations. 
As we discuss in Section III.B, the systems approach to measuring 
performance is consistent with traditional state corporate law, which allows 
corporations to be formed for any lawful purpose, and which employs the 
business judgement rule to protect the decisions of managers who are not 
blatantly enriching themselves at the corporation’s expense.170 As we also explore 
in Section III.C, the systems approach is inconsistent with recent federal 
interventions, many of which were explicitly designed to encourage managers of 
public companies to focus more on increasing shareholder returns.171 These 
interventions fall into what systems guru Donella Meadows has called the 
“system trap” of misidentifying the system’s desired purpose or goal.172 As 
Meadows notes, “if the goal is defined badly, . . . then the system can’t possibly 
produce a desirable result. Systems, like the three wishes in the traditional fairy 
tale, have a terrible tendency to produce exactly and only what you ask them to 
produce. Be careful what you ask them to produce.”173 By privileging the goals 
of the corporation’s shareholding subsystem over the goals of other important 
subsystems and the company as a whole, we submit that federal interventions 
may unwittingly threaten the public corporation’s health and sustainability.174 
 
170 See infra text accompanying notes 183–97. 
171 See infra Section III.C. 
172 MEADOWS, supra note 90, at 112, 138-41. For example, as Meadows points out: “If the 
desired system state is national security, and that is defined as the amount of money spent on the 
military, the system will produce military spending.” Id. at 138. 
173 Id. at 138. 
174 The pursuit of shareholder value can threaten not only the corporate system, but the larger 
economic system. For example, Einer Elhauge has recently shown that when large institutional 
shareholders take common positions in corporations that are horizontal competitors, these 
companies are likely to anticompetitively raise prices. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1277-78 (2016) (using the airline and banking industries to demonstrate 
that substantial horizontal shareholding raises prices). Similarly, the pursuit of a healthy corporate 
subsystem can pose a threat to larger systems, especially if those directing corporate behavior have 
different interests from the broader population. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, 
Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens 
United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 342-43 (2015) (noting that because corporate interests and 
human interests can diverge, corporations can use political spending to increase returns to 
stockholders at the expense of the broader population). These observations highlight the importance 
of selecting the correct level of systems analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 102–05. 
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III. SYSTEMS THINKING IN CORPORATE  
        PRACTICE AND CORPORATE LAW 
A. Systems Thinking in Corporate Management 
We have argued in this Article that systems theory provides an intriguing 
alternative approach to thinking about the nature and purpose of corporate 
entities, an approach that integrates elements of many of the competing 
models of the corporation that have been proposed. Systems thinking also 
offers methods for measuring corporate performance—methods with 
arguably more rigor and greater potential for truly holding managers 
accountable than the much-lauded but essentially subjective mirage of “long-
term shareholder value.” Because systems theory views corporations from a 
fundamentally different perspective than shareholder value theory (or any of 
the other theories of the corporation), space constraints prevent us from 
exploring more than a few of its implications here. Further work is more than 
worthwhile, however. For the systems approach fits comfortably with, and 
indeed explains, key aspects of corporate practice and corporate law that are 
in obvious tension with conventional shareholder value thinking. 
This tension can easily be heard, for example, in the way founders, 
directors, and executives of successful corporations talk about their business 
objectives. Given the intellectual dominance of the standard model, it is 
hardly surprising to find managers of public companies sometimes 
referencing shareholder value (especially “long-term shareholder value”) as a 
corporate goal. Yet when companies publish statements describing their 
purpose or mission, they typically describe it far more broadly, often in terms 
of providing quality goods or services, or serving multiple corporate 
stakeholders.175 (The Johnson & Johnson credo begins “We believe our first 
responsibility is to the doctors, nurses, and patients, to mothers and fathers 
and all others who use our products and services.”176). A survey of corporate 
directors similarly found that a majority viewed themselves as having 
obligations not only to shareholders but also to employees, customers, and 
 
175 See Graham Kenny, Your Company’s Purpose is Not Its Vision, Mission, or Values, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Sept. 3, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/your-companys-purpose-is-not-its-vision-mission-or-
values [https://perma.cc/RF4T-PY44] (detailing various corporate purpose statements from various 
industries, noting that companies emphasize why they seek to benefit customers). 
176 Our Credo, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, https://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/jnj-credo [https://
perma.cc/MDV6-AM4G]. Management guru Peter Drucker famously said that the single purpose of 
business is “to create a customer.” PETER DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 37 (1954). 
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the larger society.177 This embrace of multiple objectives is far more consistent 
with the systems approach than with shareholder value thinking. 
Moreover, even executives who publicly espouse shareholder value as 
their ultimate objective—and notably, many do not178—still emphasize that 
the best way to achieve that objective is not to focus directly on trying to 
“maximize” profits or share price, but instead to pay close attention to the 
company’s sales trends, employee morale, customer satisfaction, supply chain, 
and reinvestment initiatives. In line with systems thinking, they intuitively 
recognize that the best strategy for enhancing future performance in the face 
of uncertainty is to ensure that each of the company’s essential subsystems 
remains healthy and resilient. This philosophy was captured in a 2009 
Financial Times interview with iconic CEO Jack Welch, a leading champion 
of the shareholder value theory of corporate purpose. According to Welch, 
“[o]n the face of it, shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world. 
Shareholder value is a result, not a strategy . . . . Your main constituencies are 
your employees, your customers, and your products.”179 A 2012 article in the 
Harvard Business Review similarly noted: 
There’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the companies that are most 
successful at maximizing shareholder value over time are those that aim 
toward goals other than maximizing shareholder value. Employees and 
customers often know more about and have more of a long-term commitment 
to a company than shareholders do.180 
In accord with this philosophy, we see systems thinking reflected not only 
in what successful managers say, but also what they do. For example, it is 
commonplace for companies to employ operations analysts to internally assess 
corporate performance using system theory tools like network analysis, queuing 
 
177 See JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES 38-44 (1989) 
(describing survey results showing directors’ belief that they have responsibilities to a broader group 
than their shareholders). 
178 See, e.g., Geoff Colvin, Indra Nooyi’s Pepsi Challenge, FORTUNE (May 29, 2012), 
http://fortune.com/2012/05/29/indra-nooyis-pepsi-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/7ZRB-K6V5] 
(noting that PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi publicly embraced shifting away from products that 
promote obesity because it “is ‘the right thing’ to do”); Kerry A. Dolan, Starbucks’ Howard Schultz 
Wants to Redefine the Role of Business in Society, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2011/10/17/starbucks-howard-schultz-wants-to-redefine-
the-role-of-business-in-society/#6e738f6c14dc [https://perma.cc/2UU7-MS6J] (quoting Starbucks 
CEO Howard Schultz that “[i]t is no longer enough to serve customers, employees, and 
shareholders. As corporate citizens of the world, it is our responsibility—our duty—to serve the 
communities where we do business”). 
179 Francesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), https://
www.ft.com/content/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/SZF4-UN9X]. 
180 Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 
2012), https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders [https://perma.cc/JY4C-GHAZ]. 
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theory, scenario analysis, multiobjective functions, and nonlinear computer 
programs for optimizing within constraints.181 These techniques are also taught 
to students studying management science, a systems-oriented discipline 
commonly taught at many undergraduate and graduate business schools.182 
B. Systems Thinking in Corporate Law 
The consonance between the principles of systems thinking, and the ways 
successful corporate managers talk about and do their jobs, provides 
compelling evidence of the relevance of systems thinking to business 
corporations. Still more evidence can be seen in the striking way the systems 
approach fits with traditional state corporate law. 
Corporate law typically is found in three places: corporate codes, case law, 
and the “internal” law of corporate articles and bylaws. None of the three meshes 
well with shareholder value thinking. 
1. State Corporate Codes 
Starting with state corporate codes, these notably do not require 
corporations to pursue shareholder value. To the contrary, it is standard 
practice for states to allow corporations to be formed to do anything that is 
legal.183 The Delaware General Corporate Law provides, for example, that 
“[a] corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to 
conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”184 This enabling 
language implicitly contradicts the notion that corporations must adopt 
shareholder wealth maximization (or anything else) as their singular goal. 
Instead, it seems to reflect a contractarian perspective that presumes that, 
absent external costs to third parties, social welfare is best served by granting 
those who form enterprises the freedom to structure their affairs as they wish 
and to pursue the goals they desire.185 
 
181 See, e.g., COLLEGEGRAD, Operations Research Analysts: Career, Salary and Education Information, 
https://collegegrad.com/careers/operations-research-analysts [http://perma.cc/VB6B-CADy] (describing 
growing corporate demand for operations research analysts). 
182 See, e.g., Harvard Business School, Doctoral Programs: Management, www.hbs.edu/doctoral/
areas-of-study/management/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7L5A-K43P]; MIT Sloan School 
of Management, Master of Science in Management Studies, http://mitsloan.mit.edu/msms [https://
perma.cc/47TZ-N5CY]. 
183 STOUT, supra note 45, at 28 (noting that “[t]he overwhelming majority of corporate charters 
simply state that the corporation’s purpose is to do anything ‘lawful.’”). 
184 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2015). 
185 The language might reflect a state purpose of promoting social welfare by reducing the 
transactions costs associated with mutually voluntary exchanges between and among stockholders, 
creditors, managers, employees, and so forth, on the theory that, as a general rule, social welfare is 
improved by lawful exchange. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 59, at 5 (noting whether 
investors are likely to invest in entrepreneurial ventures is based on “legal and automatic enforcement 
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Indeed, the majority of states go even further than Delaware, and explicitly 
reject shareholder value theory in their codes by providing that directors may 
serve the interests not only of shareholders but other constituencies like 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community as a whole.186 Moreover, 
state codes also allow corporations to customize their articles and bylaws by 
adopting governance rules that modify or restrict shareholders’ default rights, 
for example by staggering director elections or issuing shares with limited 
voting rights.187 This statutory embrace of complexity, diversity, self-
organization, and multiple and varied purposes, is far more consistent with the 
systems approach than the idea of a single “standard” model. 
2. Case Law 
Turning to case law, some opinions at first glance seem to provide support 
for shareholder value theory. Closer inspection reveals, however, the support 
is more apparent than real. As shareholder value thinking has gained 
intellectual dominance, we occasionally see judicial opinions offhandedly 
suggest that managers ought to be maximizing “long-term shareholder 
value.”188 Yet we also see opinions suggesting the opposite: recall Justice 
Alito’s 2014 opinion for the majority in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
declaring that “modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations 
to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”189 
It is critical to note, however, that both types of statements appear only in 
dicta (as lawyers put it, “mere” dicta). If we refuse to be distracted by dicta 
and focus on holdings, we see that courts give corporate managers remarkable 
freedom to choose company objectives under the fundamental corporate law 
doctrine known as the business judgment rule.190 
 
devices”); Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381, 
383 (2016) (“Corporate law’s purpose is to provide a structure for private ordering within which a broad 
group of participants can contract for exchange and have available a governance structure to fill gaps.”). 
186 Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence 
on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1827 (2002) (finding that 
by 2000, thirty-one states had “other constituency” statutes). 
187 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §141(d) (2015) (authorizing staggered boards); id. at 
§151(a) (authorizing issuance of stock with “limited[] or no voting powers”). 
188 See, e.g., supra notes 46 and 78, and accompanying text. 
189 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). 
190 See STOUT, supra note 45, at 29-31 (giving examples of the application of business judgment rule 
in case holdings); Elhauge, supra note 23, at 777 (noting that “this business judgment rule level of 
monitoring effectively eliminates any enforceable duty to profit-maximize and leaves managers with de 
facto discretion to sacrifice a reasonable degree of corporate profits to further public interest objectives”); 
J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. L.J. 353, 353 (2017) (“[C]orporate law . . . allows[] 
directors to manage for long-term survival under cover of long-term shareholder wealth maximization.”); 
Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 170 (2014) 
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The business judgment rule holds that as long as directors are not tainted 
by conflicts of interest and make reasonable efforts to be informed, judges will 
not second-guess a board’s decision about what is best for the company—even 
when the board embraces strategies that foreseeably reduce profits or share 
price. For example, in the 2011 case of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Air Gas, 
Inc., Delaware Chancellor William B. Chandler invoked the business 
judgment rule to uphold a board decision to reject a merger offer at a premium 
price, noting that the board was “not under any per se duty to maximize 
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.”191 
Air Products v. Air Gas illustrates how, when push comes to shove, courts 
routinely refuse to impose on boards any duty to maximize profits or share 
price. The very few cases cited in support of such a supposed duty—typically 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.192 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc.193—are inapposite. The first deals not with the duties of independent 
directors, but with the duties of a majority shareholder towards minority 
shareholders.194 The second concerns a public company board’s voluntary 
decision to “go private” through a merger in which public shareholders would 
be forced out in favor of a new, controlling shareholder.195 (In this unusual 
situation, public shareholders need heightened protection because directors 
have incentive to sacrifice their interests by approving a sale at an unfairly 
low price in order to serve the new, controlling shareholder.196) Neither case 
 
(“[T]here is broad language in Delaware decisional law suggesting a Revlon duty to maximize shareholder 
value in the no-deal context, but as of yet there is no clear-cut holding on this basic issue.”). 
191 16 A.3d 48, 98 (Del. Ch. 2011) (citing Paramount Comm’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1990)). 
192 See 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does 
not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”). See generally Lynn A. Stout, 
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (discussing the 
commonly quoted passage above and explaining that it is dicta). 
193 See 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (“These standards require the directors to determine the 
best interests of the corporation and its stockholders, and impose an enhanced duty to abjure any 
action that is motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern for such interests.”). 
194 See Ford, 170 N.W. at 684 (“There should be no confusion . . . of the duties which Mr. Ford 
conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and 
his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders.”). The same is true of a modern case 
sometimes cited in support of shareholder value theory, eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 
1, 7 (2010) (“eBay asserts that . . . Jim and Craig, as directors and controlling stockholders, breached 
the fiduciary duties they owe to eBay as a minority stockholder of the corporation.”). 
195 See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 190, at 193-95. 
196 See STOUT, supra note 45, at 31 (“Subsequent Delaware cases have made clear that, so long as a 
public company intends to stay public, its directors have no Revlon duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”). 
Notably, public company boards have no obligation to put the corporation into “Revlon mode.” See 
624 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 579 
applies to independent directors of public companies planning to stay public, 
for whom the business judgment rule prevails.197 
3. Charters and Bylaws 
Finally, let us consider the internal law of corporate charters and bylaws. 
Here, the conflict between shareholder value theory and corporate law reality 
becomes still more evident. As noted, state corporate codes are enabling on the 
subject of purpose. Anything lawful is permitted.198 This means corporations 
have the option to choose to limit themselves to a single purpose: a charter could 
easily specify that a corporation’s purpose was maximizing shareholder value. 
Yet the overwhelming majority of charters describe the corporation’s purpose 
in the same flexible terms as corporate codes, as “anything lawful.”199 
This is telling. If a shareholder value maximand were such a superior 
business strategy, and so important to attract equity investors, we should 
expect to see companies trumpet shareholder value as their purpose in their 
charters, both at formation and when going public. They do not.200 
Indeed, corporations take advantage of the enabling nature of state codes 
to evolve in the opposite direction. As we explore in greater detail below, the 
rise of “activist” hedge funds and the seeping of shareholder value thinking 
into federal securities and tax rules have put pressure on public companies to 
embrace profits and share price as their only goal.201 Many are responding by 
going public with staggered boards and classified share structures that 
deliberately insulate managers from such demands.202 For example, Snap Inc., 
which sells the app Snapchat, recently filed documents revealing a plan to go 
 
Thompson, supra note 185, at 389 (noting that directors of target companies can “turn off or on” Revlon 
duties, and that “shareholder primacy at the option of directors hardly seems to qualify for the name”). 
197 Outside the public company context, both the business judgment rule and the question of 
corporate purpose are much less likely to be contested; there is seldom a reason for a controlling 
shareholder to challenge the decisions of the board that shareholder controls. 
198 STOUT, supra note 45, at 28 (noting that “the overwhelming majority of corporate charters 
simply state that the corporation’s purpose is to do anything ‘lawful’”). 
199 Id. 
200 Although it is impossible to prove a negative, the authors have never seen such a charter 
nor any source citing to such a charter. 
201 See infra text accompanying notes 207–18. 
202 See Richard J. Sandler & Joseph A. Hall, Corporate Governance Practices in US Initial Public 
Offerings, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISER 1-2 (April 2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/sandler.
hall_.directors.notes_.article.apr14.PDF [https://perma.cc/2F8W-ABXA] (summarizing studies 
showing that over 70% of the 100 largest public IPOs involved corporations that had staggered or 
classified boards; more than 90% retained “plurality voting for uncontested director elections,” and 
the percentage of companies going public with dual or multi-class share structures rose from 8% in 
2007–2008, to 28% in 2011–2013). 
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public by offering common shares with no voting rights at all.203 More are 
refusing to go public in the first place: the number of publicly listed 
companies in the U.S. has declined nearly 50% over the past decade, from 
about 8000 to about 4000, with most of the decrease due to new companies 
choosing not to list.204 Systems thinking, which emphasizes the importance 
of observing and acknowledging the system’s behavior, suggests these trends 
are significant. As we explore further below, they may indicate that the 
external pressures currently driving public companies to focus increasingly 
on observable metrics like current profits and share price are often 
dysfunctional, and the corporate sector is using the flexibility provided by 
traditional state corporate law to self-organize in response. 
C. On the Risks of Ignoring Systems 
We have shown that systems theory offers a coherent alternative approach 
for understanding corporate purpose and performance. We have also shown 
that systems thinking fits more comfortably with traditional corporate law, 
common business practices, and many elements of competing corporate 
models, than shareholder value theory does. These observations raise an 
important question. Could policy interventions driven by the dominant 
vision of shareholder value thinking—interventions that often ignore, or even 
contradict, the lessons of systems theory—do more harm than good? 
The question is not merely academic. As a number of recent law review 
articles have observed, over the past three decades the Anglo-American 
corporate landscape has shifted significantly.205 Public companies today face 
increasing pressure to become more “shareholder-centric,” and to focus on 
raising share price or reported earnings per share in the near future through 
strategies like leveraging; repurchasing shares; selling off assets; or cutting 
 
203 Steven Davidoff, Snap’s Plan is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 3, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-spiegel.html (“Snap 
Inc. is aiming to adopt the most shareholder-unfriendly governance in an initial public offering, ever.”). 
204 See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION 15-17 (2016) 
(demonstrating that the number of domestic companies listed on U.S. exchanges declined from 
more than 8000 in 1996 to just over 4000 in 2012); Bob Bryan, There are Nowhere Near as Many Public 
Companies in the U.S. as There Should Be, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2015, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-has-too-few-publicly-listed-companies-2015-6 
[https://perma.cc/EW4P-P33Q] (citing a study concluding that U.S. listings were declining while 
listings in other developed nations were increasing, and that more than half of the “listing gap” was 
attributable to new companies declining to list). 
205 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 204, at 53-79 (discussing the rise of hostile takeovers in the 1980s 
and how “the corporation existed to create shareholder value” by the early 1990s); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2013) (describing how the 
“managerialist” philosophy of decades past has been replaced by a “shareholder-centered vision”); see 
also Thompson, supra note 185, at 385 (noting “increased space for power to be exercised by 
shareholders”). See generally Rock, supra note 45. 
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accounting expenses for payroll, customer support, and research and 
development.206 Importantly, this pressure has not come from traditional 
state corporate law, which still grants corporations the flexibility to pursue 
any lawful purpose and to adopt different governance structures, and still 
protects director discretion under the business judgment rule.207 Nor has the 
pressure come from inside corporations themselves—that is, from boards of 
directors, or the demands of the employees, customers, creditors, or the initial 
equity investors who contract directly with corporate entities by seeking 
employment with them, buying their products, lending money to them, or 
buying their shares in the primary market.208 
Instead, the trend has been driven largely by external forces. These 
include innumerable federal regulatory initiatives, especially changes in tax 
rules, securities law, and Department of Labor regulations.209 To give only a 
few examples, with the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) in 1974,210 federal rules encouraged the growth of institutional 
investors (tax-favored pension and mutual funds) which now collectively 
control nearly half of all shares traded on U.S. exchanges.211 Other federal 
interventions around the same time dramatically reduced the transactions 
costs associated with trading stock, with the unintended consequence that 
many institutions now typically hold shares for 24 months or less.212 These 
new, relatively short-term institutional investors gained power when the SEC 
amended its proxy rules in 1992 to encourage them to play a more active role 
in corporate governance, including mounting proxy contests to challenge 
 
206 See supra note 27 (citing publications by experts and research foundations expressing 
concerns over such short-term strategies). 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 190–97. 
208 See Statement on Company Law, supra note 20 (explaining that pressure on corporations to 
maximize profits for shareholders comes from “financial markets, activist shareholders, the threat of 
a hostile takeover and/or stock-based compensation schemes”). 
209 See Rock, supra note 45, at 1922 (discussing the market and regulatory developments that 
have changed corporate structures); Stout, supra note 205, at 2008-10 (explaining that 1993 changes 
to the tax code led executives to derive most of their pay from stock options and grants, incentivizing 
dramatic stock price growth); Thompson, supra note 185, at 385 (noting that the shift has not come 
from “changes in Delaware law but from [market] changes in the composition of the shareholder 
population and a nudge from federal regulations”). 
210 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1974). 
211 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 1201 
(2012), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s1201.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2HN-9LUY] (charting the relative growth in the value of public equities held 
by U.S. retirement and mutual funds and households from 2000 to 2010). 
212 The elimination of fixed brokerage commissions in 1975 dramatically reduced trading costs 
and holding periods, which now average months instead of years. See STOUT, supra note 45, at 66 
(stating that average holding period on NYSE has fallen from eight years in 1960, to an implied 
average of four months in 2010); Stout, supra note 87, at 618 (noting the elimination of fixed 
brokerage commissions and transaction taxes). 
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directors.213 1993 saw another critical change when Congress amended the tax 
code to require public companies to tie executive pay to “objective 
performance metrics,” driving companies to compensate executives in ways 
that encouraged a laser-like focus on measures like share price appreciation 
or total shareholder return (TSR).214 Then the SEC in 2003 furthered the 
shift to a shareholder-centric model by adopting rules requiring exchange-
listed companies to have a majority of independent directors on their boards 
(independent directors are more responsive to shareholder demands than 
“inside” directors who are also employees)215 and requiring mutual funds to 
publicly disclose how they vote shares held in their portfolios.216 This last rule 
change spurred the growth of the remarkably powerful—and remarkably 
unaccountable—“proxy advisory” service known as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS),217 which has added substantially to the pressure public 
companies feel to pursue shareholder value as their dominant objective. 218 
There is theoretical reason to question whether policy interventions 
springing from such sources are always, or even often, wise or efficient. State 
corporate law is mostly common law or derived from common law principles; 
as a number of scholars have noted, the common law tends to evolve to favor 
efficient rules.219 In contrast, federal legislation and administrative 
rulemaking are notoriously vulnerable to interest group lobbying and rent-
seeking.220 Moreover, state corporate law is contractarian. It permits 
individuals forming corporations to choose from among a variety of possible 
governance patterns (single versus multiple classes of shares, unitary versus 
classified board structures, and so forth). It also grants shareholders, 
bondholders, executives, and employees alike the freedom to decline to do 
business with corporations that adopt inefficient or exploitive governance 
rules, thus encouraging incorporators to adopt rules that serve all corporate 
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217 Lynn A. Stout, Why Should ISS be the New Master of the Corporate Governance Universe?, in 
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218 Tamara Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for 
Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 407 (2009) (discussing the massive 
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schools and law schools. See WEST, supra note 45, at 17-18. 
219 See, e.g., DAVID A. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND 
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participants.221 In contrast, federal regulation tends toward a rigid, “one-size-
fits-all” approach that threatens companies’ resilience by limiting their ability 
to self-organize in response to changes in the market environment,222 and that 
insulates incorporators from the competitive pressures that otherwise might 
encourage them to select efficient rules. Finally, a major consequence of 
federal regulatory interventions has been to empower private institutions 
whose interests, there is reason to suspect, are not aligned with the survival 
and functioning of the corporation as a system. For example, activist hedge 
funds can profit from buying shares in the secondary market, pushing for 
changes in corporate charters and bylaws223 or in federal regulation224 (thus 
“changing the rules in the middle of the game,” possibly at the expense of 
other players like employees or bondholders), and selling soon after. The 
powerful proxy advisory service ISS is notoriously even less accountable.225 
All this is theory, of course. But several empirical observations give 
further reason to question whether the federally driven push to make public 
corporations more shareholder focused has overshot the mark, privileging the 
goals of the shareholding subsystem to the exclusion and at the expense of 
the corporate system as a whole. In particular, the standard model predicts 
that the shift should have produced more and stronger public corporations 
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that provide higher returns to equity investors. This prediction has not been 
realized. To the contrary, as noted earlier, over the past decade the number of 
public companies listed on U.S. exchanges has been cut in half.226 Corporate 
life expectancy has declined even further: where in the 1960s the average 
Fortune 500 company could expect to remain on that list for 60 years or more, 
today the figure is 15 years.227 Optimists might dismiss such numbers as 
evidence of “creative destruction.” But if the destruction were creative, we 
should see increased returns from holding stock in these fewer, more short-
lived companies. This has not happened. Although some activist investors 
have earned above-market returns, the shift toward more shareholder-centric 
corporations has not benefited long-term, diversified investors. Indeed, 
average returns from holding public equity may have declined.228 There is 
reason to question whether the embrace of shareholder value theory has 
created greater shareholder value. 
Given such trends, it is unsurprising to hear a growing chorus of voices 
question the wisdom of requiring companies to privilege immediate 
shareholder returns over other possible corporate goals and objectives.229 Yet 
many governance experts and business leaders continue to presume that 
maximizing “long-term” shareholder value is the only proper objective of the 
corporation, primarily because they see no attractive alternative for holding 
managers accountable.230 System theory provides that alternative. In the 
process, it supports and explains important elements of corporate practice, 
corporate law, and competing models of the corporation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the dominant role corporations play in our economy, culture, and 
politics, the nature and purpose of corporations remains hotly contested. 
Although the prevailing narrative for the past quarter century has been that 
corporations belong to shareholders and should pursue shareholder value, 
support for this approach, which has been justified as assuring managerial 
accountability, is eroding. It persists today primarily in the form of the argument 
that corporations should seek “long-term” shareholder value. Yet, as this Article 
has shown, when shareholder value is interpreted to mean “long-term” 
shareholder value, it no longer offers that desired managerial accountability. 
What can? Systems theory offers an answer. It provides an approach to 
understanding the nature and purpose of corporate entities that is not only 
consistent with elements of many otherwise-conflicting visions of the firm, 
but also with important features of corporate law and practice. It offers 
proven methods for measuring corporate performance that recognize the 
possibility of multiple goals and the importance of sustainability. And it 
cautions that, by ignoring the lessons of systems theory, shareholder value 
thinking may have encouraged regulatory and policy interventions into 
corporate governance that are not only ineffective, but destructive. 
In exploring the lessons of systems thinking, and particularly why it might 
not always (or even often) be desirable to demand that managers “maximize 
shareholder value,” we do not mean to suggest that shareholder returns and 
managerial accountability are unimportant corporate objectives. The 
shareholding system is an important subsystem of any public corporation; to 
thrive, public companies must offer returns that attract and keep equity 
investors. Moreover, shareholder governance rights, and compensation 
practices that pay attention to accounting profits and other financial metrics, 
can help police against managerial shirking and self-dealing. Finally, there 
may be particular businesses or industries in which a singular focus on short-
term financial results is more appropriate.231 
But systems theory warns against always defining and measuring a 
corporate enterprise solely in terms of shareholder-centric goals and metrics, 
as this allows the goals of the shareholding subsystem to eclipse the goals of 
the corporate system as a whole. For the most part, states have managed to 
resist the pressure to change their laws to support shareholder value theory. 
However, it has stealthily crept into federal law, especially tax code rules that 
tie executive pay to objective performance metrics, and SEC rules that 
empower short-term investors and measure corporate performance by 
 
231 For example, a greater focus on shareholder returns may be more appropriate in investment 
companies, where shareholders are also the customers. 
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shareholder near-term returns. Activist investors have used the rhetoric of 
shareholder value as a cudgel to browbeat boards into selling assets, 
repurchasing shares, and cutting payroll and research and development to 
achieve short-term share price increases. Finally, shareholder value theory has 
been taught as gospel to a generation of policymakers and business leaders. 
Over the past quarter century, these developments have significantly 
influenced business behavior, especially in publicly listed companies. They 
have been accompanied by declining corporate numbers, decreasing corporate 
life expectancy, and reduced shareholder returns. 
Corporations are perpetual entities designed to operate into an uncertain 
future. They are comprised of elements and subsystems, each of which has an 
individual purpose that may at times come into conflict with the overarching 
purpose of the corporation. Systems thinking accepts, rather than dismisses, 
these realities. It honors the corporation as its own separate legal entity, while 
recognizing the state’s part in its creation. It respects the important roles 
played by shareholders and other stakeholders, while also explaining the 
board’s function in mediating among these interests to keep the system in 
check. It acknowledges that the corporate system exists as part of a larger 
system, which we can broadly call community or society. Finally, it reveals 
how the quest to find a single quantifiable metric to ensure managerial 
accountability is a quixotic venture that offers at most an illusion of 
objectivity and certainty. Systems theory provides an alternative that offers 
both greater managerial accountability and fewer destructive consequences. 
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